

UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

FACULTY OF EDUCATION

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MICROPOLITICS OF THE  
SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT: A CASE STUDY OF A SCHOOL  
IN THE WESTERN CAPE

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for  
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BY

SETH BAISIE GHARTEY

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

- |             |                                       |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. cf.      | refer to/compare with                 |
| 2. DET /DOE | Department of Education and Training  |
| 3. GB/GBs   | Governing Body/Governing Bodies       |
| 4. MEC      | Member of Executive Council           |
| 5. MMFC     | Middle Class Mandatory Fee Clustering |
| 6. PGE      | Provincial Gazette Extraordinary      |
| 7. PTSA     | Parent-Teacher-Student Association    |
| 8. SASA     | South African Schools Act             |
| 9. SASB     | South African Schools Bill            |
| 10. SRC     | Students Representative Council       |
| 11. WP1     | Draft White Paper 1                   |
| 12. WP2a    | White Paper 2a                        |
| 13. WP2b    | White Paper 2b                        |

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## **INTRODUCTION**

### **Purpose of the Research**

The apartheid system of government in South Africa created undemocratic governing structures, inequity and inequality in the country's education system, as were evident in the pattern of school organisation, governance and funding (Hunter Commission Report, 1995: 1). This situation led to the emergence of a series of policy documents following the election of a democratic government in 1994, leading to the birth of the South African Schools Act (the SASA) (No. 84 of 1996), in November 1996.

The SASA, according to its preamble, is to *inter alia* provide a uniform system of education for the organisation, governance and funding of schools; promote democracy; and redress past injustices and inequalities. A critical examination of its contents and the texts immediately preceding it, viz: The White Paper on Education and Training entitled Education and Training in a Democratic South Africa: *First Steps to Develop a New System* (March 1995) (hereafter referred to as White Paper 1), The Report of the Committee to Review the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (the Hunter Commission Report) (August 1995), The Draft White Paper on the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (White Paper 2a) (November 1995), The White Paper on Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (White Paper 2b) (February 1996), and The South African Schools Bill (April 1996), reveals a range of values, goals and ideologies that have shifted because choices had to be made and trade-offs resorted to, in order to mirror the country's Government of National Unity's focus on correcting apartheid disparities in the education system. However, these choices and trade-offs could not prevent the SASA from being devoid of tensions and contradictions, particularly in the areas of governance and funding.

Considering in particular, the fact that micropolitics exists in schools, since the participants (the principals, teachers, students, parents, the community and the governing body) struggle for power, status, personal values and survival and, in general, the fact that "policy is not simply a matter of being written and then being

passively received and acted upon” (Sayed and Maharaj, 1997: 1), it was felt that the successful execution of the reforms that the SASA seeks to achieve could be impeded.

Consequently, an investigation into the micropolitics of the SASA was undertaken to ascertain the impact of micropolitics of the schools’ life on the SASA - viz: the extent to which the participants in schools have responded favourably to the SASA - in the areas of governance and funding - so as to reveal the implications of the findings for subsequent macro educational policy formulation.

### **Organisation of the Research Report**

The report comprises six chapters. In the first, micropolitics is defined, its sources explained, and the way it operates in schools described and illustrated.

In the second chapter, the pattern of school organisation, governance and funding, prior to the birth of the SASA is described. This description provides the basis for the evolution of the SASA which contains the macro educational reform for schools.

There are two sections in the third chapter. In the first section an analysis of the key themes identified in the SASA is dealt with. Here, some tensions and contradictions in the SASA, with special reference to governance and funding, are picked and critically considered within the framework of Ball’s (1994) model of policy analysis. This analysis partly unfolds the factors that have triggered off this study. In the second section a comparison of the SASA and the Western Cape Provincial School Education Act (No. 12 of 1997) together with an analysis of the implementation of the SASA by the Western Cape Province is provided. The purpose is to show the relationship between the two policy texts so as to explain the manner in which the SASA is applied in schools through the provincial education policy.

In the fourth chapter, the methodological framework adopted for the investigation is described; the reasons for the adoption of the framework given; and the procedures followed in the utilisation of the framework as well as the problems and limitations encountered mentioned.



The analysis of the results of the investigation is provided in the fifth chapter. At the beginning of this analysis is a history of the field of study. This is to present a picture of the changes that have occurred since the inception of the SASA and to help determine the successes and failures of the SASA.

Finally, the sixth chapter presents a summary and conclusion to the study.

University of Cape Town

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **MICROPOLITICS: ITS SOURCES AND OPERATION IN SCHOOLS**

*How policy is created - the mobilisation of forces for change - is crucially important, but so too is the frequently overlooked question of what happens to policy reforms once they enter the realm of individual institutions (Gillborn, 1994:147).*

As noted by Gillborn in the quotation above, it is unlikely that in the face of micropolitics of 'individual institutions' schools will act exactly to what the SASA stipulates. This chapter seeks to explain why schools would react to the SASA in a particular way.

To begin with, it appears *micropolitics* is inconspicuous and so little is known about it: Hoyle (1982) calls it the "dark side of organisational life" (in Westoby, 1988: 256); Blase (1991) also speaks of it as something "not easily observed" (in Blase and Anderson, 1995:1); and Ball says it is an "area of what we do not know about schools...." (1993:7). For this reason, the terminology will be defined and explained comprehensively, and its sources and manner of operation in schools briefly outlined.

#### **1.1 Micropolitics Defined**

'Micropolitics' is defined in various ways. Pfeffer defines it as "those activities taken within organisations to acquire, develop, and use power and other resources to obtain preferred outcomes in a situation in which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices" (1981: 7).

Hoyle (1982; in Westoby, 1988:256) says it embraces "those strategies by which individuals and groups in organisational contexts seek to use their resources of power and influence to further their interests".

And Blase (1991) defines it comprehensively as follows:

Micropolitics refers to the use of formal and informal power by individuals and groups to achieve their goals in organisations. In large part, political actions result from perceived differences between individuals and groups, coupled with the motivation to use power to influence and/or protect. Although such actions are consciously motivated, any action, consciously or unconsciously motivated, may have political 'significance' in a given situation. Both co-operative and conflicting actions and processes are part of the realm of micropolitics (in Blase and Anderson, 1995: 3).

Thus micropolitics refers to the miniature politics that obtains in organisations. But unlike the 'big' politics (*viz*, Central and Local Government politics in a state) where politicians compete for the votes of citizens, micropolitics is basically about the strategic use of power in organisations and how this power is used for purposes of influence and protection (of interests). Over and above this, micropolitics entails conflict, because people struggle with one another to achieve what they aim at. Also, micropolitics results in co-operation, for people unite to realise their objectives. Blase (1991) puts this succinctly:

Micropolitics is about power and how people use it to influence others and to protect themselves. It is about conflict and how people compete with each other to get what they want. It is about co-operation and how people build support among themselves to achieve their ends. It is about what people in all social settings think about and have strong feelings about, but what is so often unspoken and not easily observed (in Blase and Anderson, 1995:1).

## **1.2 Sources of Micropolitics and How It Operates in Schools.**

Micropolitics operates in organisations including educational institutions, especially schools. In schools, principals, teachers, students, and parents struggle for power, status, personal values and/or survival. This has rendered such institutions political arenas. Ball rightly observes this when he says: "I take schools, in common with virtually all other social organisations, to be arenas of struggle; to be riven with actual or potential conflict between members; to be poorly co-ordinated; to be ideologically diverse" (1993:19).

the school has created a situation in which the internal organisation of the school has begun to resemble what Bell calls “anarchic organisation” (1980: 187). However,

The anarchic organisation is not, as its name might imply, a formless or unpredictable collection of individuals. Rather it is an organisation with a structure of its own which is partly determined by external pressures and partly a product of the nature of the organisation itself. It is anarchic in the sense that the relationship between goals, members and technology is not as clearly functional as conventional organisation theory indicates that it will be (ibid).

For this reason schools have to find a means of managing micropolitical pressure, especially when it comes to organisational and decision-making issues meant for reforms such as those that the SASA seeks. The reasons are relatively simple:

First, “parents and teachers want to do different things with the child” (Waller, 1932; in Blase and Anderson, 1995:6) even though both parties are interested in the welfare of the child. This can generate conflict between teachers and parents, especially when parents want to get involved in enhancing their children’s performance in school. For example, teachers’ judgements about grades and the values they want to instil in pupils may contradict those of parents. Similarly, in terms of the SASA provisions, it is possible for conflict to arise from issues such as admissions if, for example, the Governing Body (GB) chooses to admit or charge learners a particular fee based on a criterion contrary to the interest of any of the participants of the school (for example, parents, students or teachers).

Second, teacher authority and parental authority about school matters are often overlapping and unclear. What therefore happens, sometimes, is that each party tends to believe that it has the right to determine educational practices in the school. The result is that parents who challenge school values are, just like their children, labelled “a problem”. This also creates another potential source of conflict because, as an example, a parent’s tendency to intrude in school matters and to question teachers’ authority, especially in ways that contradict interpersonal and professional norms for reasonable, productive and supportive interaction, may greatly undermine the teachers.

This overlapping of authority may also happen in terms of the SASA's policy on disciplinary matters such as prohibition of corporal punishment (section 10, p.10).

Another source of micropolitics in schools is lack of consensus and goal diversity; what Turner (1977) calls "problematic preferences", which imply that "[the schools are] never very clear what [their goals are, what [they are] really trying to do...." (in Westoby, 1988:79). Because of the structural looseness of schools as well as the schools' relationship with their environment, the goals shift and conflict with one another; are different to different groups of participants; and cannot be translated into clear-cut programmes of action with ease. The different groups usually try to promote their own objectives as the official purposes of the institution, resulting in conflict between the goals of the various groups, because a focus on one objective may be at the expense of another. For example, a proposal by a principal to seek changes meant for students' improvement in subjects regarded as core (such as English and Mathematics) may be objected to by teachers concerned about the implications for foundation subjects. Thus once the institutional goal satisfies some individuals but not all aspirations, or once individual and institutional goals become incompatible, there is bound to be conflict. Traces of this problem surface in this study about the SASA's provision on funding (cf: Chapter 5).

Even though there is looseness in the bureaucratic structure of schools, because schools are primarily built on hierarchical lines, the structure inhibits face-to-face interaction and promotes conflicts in schools. As noted by Ferguson (1984):

Modern bureaucracies prohibit face-to-face relations among most of their members. They aim at arranging individuals and tasks so as to secure continuity and stability and to remove ambiguity in relations among participants, but are nonetheless usually beset by a variety of internal conflicts. *In fact, bureaucracies are political arenas in which struggles for power, status, personal values, and/or survival are endemic* (in Blase and Anderson, 1995:146).

Thus since micropolitics involves "a conflict between individuals and groups for the acquisition of power, which the victors use to their advantage at the expense of the

vanquished” Duverger (1972: 19), educational reform will advance or enhance the position of certain groups and disadvantage or damage the position of others. Self interests of some teachers, students, or members of the community will be threatened because the established identities of these groups may be undermined, or in the case of teachers, their job satisfaction could be reduced. For example, the introduction of new working practices which replace entrenched and cherished ways of working can threaten the self-concept of some teachers. Vested interests could also be under threat because reforms involve the redistribution of resources, the restructuring of job allocations and redirection of lines of information flow.

Obviously then, change processes in schools would frequently take the form of political conflict between advocacy and opposition groups. Factional groups would seek to advance or defend their interests (by being for or against the change) either through clandestine manoeuvres or through lobbying. In the process, negotiations and compromises might result in amendments to initial proposals; certain groups or individuals may be exempted, bargains resorted to, and trade-offs arranged, though this may not be the end of the conflict, as the trade-off may generate feedback in the form of new conflicts, or the major losers in the conflict may gird up their loins for a new cycle of conflict.

However, notwithstanding the above, micropolitics plays an important role in reforms and many writers have acknowledged this. For example, Willower (1963) points out that “resistance can be rational and based on honest disagreement. Certainly, resistance sometimes serves to clarify motives, points of view, and loyalties” (in Hanson, 1979: 313). Baldrige also argues that it is worth distinguishing between constructive and destructive forms of the conflict that micropolitics produces, because “conflict can be and often is quite healthy; or it may revitalise an otherwise stagnant system (1971: 202).

It is evident from the definitions of micropolitics and the discussion about its sources and the way it operates in schools that the manner in which the SASA has to operate in schools would be influenced. The next chapter describes why and how the SASA evolved.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS ACT (THE SASA)**

*... this country requires a new national system for schools which will redress past injustices in educational provision, provide an education of progressively high quality for all learners and ... uphold the rights of all learners, parents and educators, and promote their acceptance of responsibility for the organisation, governance and funding of schools in partnership with the State; and to set uniform norms and standards for the education of learners at schools and the organisation, governance and funding of schools throughout the Republic of South Africa;.... (SASA, 1996: preamble).*

#### **2.1 Background**

The above preamble is suggestive of the kind of imbalances in the South African education system before 1996, when the South African Schools Act (the SASA) was introduced.

Indeed, education for Africans, preceding the apartheid laws, was geared towards serving the economic and political needs of dominant groups in society. Hunt Davis rightly observed this when he described African education policies of the 1920s as a mechanism for preparing 'indigenous' people who would work on the land and remain in a subordinate position. He explained that "South Africa's future development depended heavily on agriculture and Africans could best contribute to the country's welfare through improved farming of their own small holdings or by working on white owned farms" (1984:113).

Therefore as far back as 1952 the then Minister of National Education, Dr. Verwoed, in a debate about the introduction of 'Bantu Education', which he designed for Africans, argued:

There is no place for him (the African) in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.... For this reason there is no reason for

him to receive a training which aims to allow him into the European community.... (1952; in Molteno, 1984: 92).

Consequently, from this Verwoedean concept of African education, there arose the following pattern of school organisation, governance, and funding:

## **2.2 Patterns of School Organisation, Governance and Funding Prior to the Emergence of the SASA.**

Until 1994 there were fifteen different Education Departments in South Africa, including the Department of National Education (DNE), which was responsible for co-ordinating and establishing countrywide norms and standards. Apart from the DNE which did not operate any schools, each of the fourteen ministries had its own configuration of models of school ownership, governance and funding (Hunter Commission Report, 1995:15).

Table 1 below shows the number of schools of different types which existed in the former education departments together with their enrolments. The table shows that of the fourteen departments, four were in the 'independent' homelands, six in the self-governing territories (i.e. the 'non-independent' homelands), one responsible for the Department of Education and Training (DET) catering for Africans outside the homelands, and one in each of the three tricameral houses of parliament catering for Whites (which was provincialised into four departments: Cape Education Department, Transvaal Education Department, Natal Education Department and Orange Free State Department of Education), Coloureds and Indians, respectively. Although not all the figures in the table are for the same year, the table gives an overview of the pattern of school ownership and thus demonstrates the different types of school in existence at this period.

These administrative divisions, together with the different models of school ownership, governance and funding, were reinforced by inequities and inequalities between the resources available to departments catering for different race groups.



An examination of Table 2 below as well as the models of school ownership, governance and funding, together with their accompanying problems, reveal the disparities.

**TABLE 2: Per Capita Expenditure by Former Departments, 1994**

<b>Former Departments</b>	<b>Amount (Rand)</b>
House of Assembly .....	5 403
House of Delegates .....	4 687
House of Representatives .....	3 691
Qwaqwa.....	2241
Dept of Educ & Training .....	2 184
Ciskei.....	2 056
Venda.....	1 792
Gazankulu.....	1 699
KwaZulu.....	1 459
<u>Transkei.....</u>	<u>1 053</u>
<u>Average</u>	<u>2 222</u>

*Source: Hunter Commission Report (1995: 15).*

The figures in the table show that the funding system best favoured the House of Assembly, the department catering for White schools, followed by the departments catering for Coloured and Indian schools - House of Delegates and House Representatives respectively; while the departments catering for African schools were least funded.

The disparities become more conspicuous when the funding norm is taken at 100%. In this case, the departments that catered for White, Indian and Coloured schools, were far above the norm: 186.6%, 161%, and 158.6% respectively. The DET which catered for African schools in the non-bantustan areas approximated the norm: 100.2%. the self-governing territories were below the norm: 73.6%. The Transkei, Venda,

Bophutatswana and Ciskei (TVBC) education departments were far below the norm (Cape Argus, 1996:25; in Gilmour, 1997:4).

Further disparities are revealed in the following models of school ownership, governance and funding. The disparities centre on the ways the schools were governed and funded and, thus, provide the basis for the evolution of the SASA. According to the Hunter Commission Report (1995:16-22) there were five main models. These were State Schools; Community Schools; State-aided and farm Schools; Model 'C' Schools; and Private schools.

*State Schools* were those owned by the State. They formed about 33% of the total number of schools in the country. Although they had a statutory governance structure composed of parents, this tended to be purely advisory and consultative, with no substantive powers. Except for the schools of the House of Delegates where official governance structures included teachers' representatives, all the governance structures of the schools in the state departments consisted only of parents and usually the school principal (as an ex-officio member) (ibid: 16-18). State Schools were funded by the State, and though they charged fees, the fees were not legally enforceable and the schools did not depend on them for resources such as teachers' salaries, books, library and laboratory facilities (where these existed) (Hunter Commission Report, 1995: 16).

In view of the imbalances in educational provision, State Schools differed widely in quality, funding and prestige, depending partly on the department that controlled them. For example, the State Schools of 'rural' Transkei did not enjoy the same levels of quality, funding (from the State), and prestige, as the relatively well-resourced schools of the Houses of Assembly, Delegates and Representatives (ibid). It is these imbalances in educational provision, as will be noted later, that the SASA seeks to redress, in order to provide an education of progressively high quality for all learners.

*Community Schools* constituted about 30% of the total number of schools. They were built and maintained by communities, except those in the urban areas (i.e. townships) where such schools were generally built by the State. Depending on the availability of

funds, communities which built their own schools received a subsidy on completion of the work (ibid: 18).

Community Schools also had statutory governance structures called school committees, which consisted of parents. Such committees had no real power to influence school policy but played a role in mobilising community funding in order to pay for new buildings, maintenance costs and other running expenses. Traditional leaders also had an influence in the governance of many rural Community Schools. They were responsible for allocating the land on which a school was built and generally controlled the collection of community funds for classroom building. Their position or power within the community in general often gave them a decisive power over the schools' decisions, despite the existence of school committees within formal powers (Hunter Commission Report, 1995: 19).

Many of the schools in the rural areas, whether Community, State or Farm Schools, were so poorly resourced that some had to employ privately, unqualified and poorly paid, teachers to make up for inadequate provision by education departments (ibid). The quality of education in such communities are, thus, obvious.

*State-Aided and Farm Schools* formed 27% of the entire number of schools and belonged to farmers on whose private farms the schools were established. Not all of these schools had governing bodies because the establishment of such bodies was optional. Where governing bodies existed, they consisted of the owner or manager of the farm and, sometimes, a maximum of four parents. The farmers (or the governing bodies, where they existed) had wide-ranging powers over management and professional matters, including the power to control the admission of learners; to advise the department on the appointment, control and discharge of teachers; and to close the school (subject to their registration contract with the department) (ibid:20). Thus any democratic participation that the parents on the governing body enjoyed was not theirs by right.

As regards funding, the farmers received from the State a subsidy amounting to 100% of the cost of building the school and 50% of the maintenance costs. Further, the State bore the costs of school furniture, teachers' salaries and expenses such as stationery and textbooks (ibid). Yet, the quality of education was poor as many of the teachers were poorly qualified.

*Model C Schools* totalled 7% of the number of schools in the country. They came into being when, in April 1992, most of the State Schools for whites, the best resourced and best staffed schools in the State system, were given the option to convert to 'Model C' status as an expression of the parents' willingness to take over part of the financial burden of the schools in order to maintain their existing levels of funding, since the State intended to cut down on funding to such schools. Thus by 1994 about 94% of the former House of Assembly schools had been rendered Model Cs (Hunter Commission Report, 1995: 21).

The governing bodies (GBs) of such schools, which included the school principals (as ex-officio members), were elected by the parents. Such bodies exercised extensive and wide ranging powers on behalf of their schools. For example, they:

- determined the general thrust of school policy;
- set financial policy and managed the funds of the school (subject to an independent audit);
- determined tuition fees and could sue defaulting parents, but could not expel or deny any child an opportunity to learn simply on account of non-payment of fees;
- appointed, promoted and dismissed staff members (subject to applicable labour laws);
- determined the schools admission policy;
- decided on additional curriculum programmes (as deemed desirable by the parents);
- generated their own funds and resources; and
- appointed additional staff members to those paid for by the State (and paid them from the school funds)

(ibid).

The State paid for salaries of teachers according to a fixed learner-teacher ratio. In practice this amounted to 75%-85% of operating costs. All other expenses (as mentioned in the preceding paragraph) for example, salaries of additional teachers, were borne by the GBs (ibid). Thus an examination of the governance and funding system of these schools reveals the quality of education that obtained there as compared to the other schools like Community and Farm Schools.

*Private or Independent Schools* were those schools allowed to operate, provided that the private individuals, companies, trusts or churches, who owned them complied with minimum conditions like approved school curricula, calendar, buildings and ground, as well as minimum qualifications requirements for teaching staff, for registration with a State education department (ibid: 22). Such schools formed just about 2% of the total number of schools in the country (ibid: 18).

The governance of such schools was in the hands of their owners. With regard to funding, some were subsidised by an education department of the State but most of their funding was raised through fees. Consequently, their fees were very high and the schools largely exclusive.

It is apparent then, that there existed vast disparities in educational provision during the apartheid era. These disparities created problems worth mentioning.

## **2.3 Major Problems Associated with the Pattern of School**

### **Organisation, Governance and Funding.**

First, there were *administrative problems*. As noted in the Hunter Commission Report (1995: 26) “the plethora of school types, developed in the context of multiple education departments...[differed] in the details of their governance and funding status, depending on their...departments”; and schools falling into a single category (for example, State and Community Schools) were no exception. Consequently, it was difficult to manage the schools under a single provincial education department.

Secondly, there was the problem of *weaknesses of the governance structures*. In all the statutory governance structures, teachers, learners and, in most cases, members of the broader community, were not involved in the GBs. Student Representative Councils (SRCs) were established in many schools without the approval of the school managements, and in most schools they were not recognised as official organs of school governance. The result was poor communication between different stakeholders and, for that matter, conflict and disruption of schooling (ibid: 27).

As part of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) campaign to develop a new and democratic system of education which would empower all participants in the educational process and provide an institutional framework in which all could participate in overcoming educational crises, Parent-Teacher- Students Associations (PTSAs) were established from the mid-1980s in many schools, especially in Black schools, but also in a number of schools for Coloureds and Indians. But these alternative governance structures too did not have defined roles and purposes for the member categories (i.e. the parents, teachers and students). Besides, the member categories did not have adequate skills and knowledge necessary to fulfil their functions competently. As a result, there were occasional conflicts between schools and government education departmental management (Hunter Commission Report, 1995: 22-23).

Up until 1994, there had not been any common legislation or a set of regulations to guide the functioning of governance structures across the departments, and most of the relinquishing departments had little or no capacity-building programmes for those in governance structures or even for school managers (ibid: 27).

Thirdly, there was *Restricted Access to Schools*. The apartheid system of government created a situation where certain schools, for example, the Model C and Community Schools, with particular patterns of ownership, governance and funding, existed only in areas formerly reserved for particular race groups. In the white farming areas, the farm schools were meant for the children of farm workers but not for the children of White farmers because of the low educational quality of such schools (ibid: 25).

Furthermore, the better quality schools, viz, White, Coloured and Indian schools, were geographically located in areas which, for the most part, were not easily accessible to African learners. Farmers who had the means at their disposal could send their children to Model C or Private Schools for good quality education, even where they had schools on their own farms. But the poor farm workers were compelled to let their children attend the Farm Schools because they could not afford the expenses involved in sending their children elsewhere.

Moreover, in some areas only Model C Schools existed and so White children and subsequently some African children of poor parents (example, domestic workers) living in such areas, who could not afford the fees charged by these schools and who were unable to find alternative schools in their area, had their school fees subsidised by the State. But other poor children had to commute to township schools or be sent to live with relatives in rural areas (ibid: 27). Thus access to school was highly restricted, especially for the poor African children.

Finally, there was the problem of *Inequity*. Whereas in urban areas, the State paid for the cost of buildings and other expenses, in the rural communities and the Community Schools, a high percentage of these costs were borne by the poor people. As mentioned earlier, the departments, which to a large extent determined the resources available to schools, were organised along racial and ethnic lines and the schools that they ran were largely attended by children of the same racial or ethnic groups. This racially-based system generated differences in per capita expenditure between the departments.

The inequitable funding arrangements, as well as the lack of democratic structures in the entire education system, hampered the development of quality schools especially in the rural and African areas. In such areas the inadequate funding prevented the provision of minimum resources necessary for quality schooling, and the governance structures which excluded communities from any meaningful influence over the way schools were run, discouraged community efforts to improve the quality of the schools.

A further consequence of the Bantu Education was the quality of teachers that emerged from the system. As noted by Ramphele (1992:16):

Deliberate anti-education through Bantu Education to produce nothing more than 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' out of Africans has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of Dr H. F. Verwoed, the architect of apartheid. The process has now gone full circle with products of this system of education constituting the majority of the teaching core with devastating consequences for the quality of black school leavers.

Indeed, the low level of professionalism among teachers and the authoritarian and hierarchical structures of control, as well as the fragility and inappropriateness of the administration system (Morphet *et al*, 1986:28) led to considerable amount of time lost for effective education through practices such as violence and strikes (Taylor, 1995:11). Also, there were unmanageable teacher/pupil ratios and a lack of classrooms, books and equipment (Ismail, 1993: 86), which produced "devastating consequences for the quality of black school leavers" (Ramphele, 1992:16) and resulted in a lack of a culture of learning and poor matriculation results, for according to Lemon (1995:134) 39% of African pupils passed matriculation in 1993, as compared with 95% of White pupils. In addition,

the socio-economic conditions created by past policies, have resulted in a breakdown of family life, the destruction of communities, alienation, gangsterism and high levels of crime and violence. These in turn have led to political and economic instability and uncertainty, a reduction in enthusiasm for investment in the country, a perception of low productivity and a lack of global competitiveness (Papendorp, 1996:7).

It is against this background that the SASA evolved in order to meet the objectives set down in its preamble.



## 2.4 The Evolution of the SASA.

The origins of the SASA may be traced back to the series of education and education-related policy discussion documents that emerged before and just after the democratic elections of 1994. Among the documents are the National Education Policy Investigation (1991-93); the African National Congress Discussion Paper on Education Policy (1991); and the White Paper on Education and Training entitled *Education and Training in Democratic South Africa: First Steps to Develop a New System* (March 1995) (hereafter referred to as WP 1) (cf. Sayed, 1997b: 25-30). However, the policy documents that immediately gave birth to the SASA after the elections were the Report of the Committee to Review the Organisation, Governance and Funding of Schools (the Hunter Commission Report), the Draft Education White Paper 2 (WP 2a), the Education White Paper 2 (WP2b) and the South African Schools Bill (the SASB).

The Hunter Commission Report emerged in August 1995 after WP 1 had made the following recommendation:

...because inequality is so deep-rooted in our educational history and dominates the present provision of schooling, a new policy for school provision must be a policy for increasing access ... achieving equity in public funding, eliminating illegal discrimination, creating democratic governance, rehabilitating schools and raising the quality of performance (WP 1, par. 1, p. 67).

The purpose of the Commission then, was to recommend a national framework of school organisation, governance and funding (Hunter Commission Report, 1995: ix). The recommendations are summarised below.

Concerning organisation, the committee recommended the replacement of the State, Community, Farm, State-aided (including Model C schools) and Private schools, with two categories of schools, viz, Public (or State Funded Schools) and Independent (or Private Schools), in order to establish a unitary system of education and uphold basic principles like equity, redress, quality and efficiency (ibid: section 5.13, p.44).

In terms of governance, there were to be GBs that would determine and adopt policies within the national and provincial visions for education. Parents, students, teachers, principals, the non-teaching staff and the community were to constitute the GBs with parents or guardians forming the majority of each body, and principals sitting on GBs as ex-officio members (ibid, section 6.27, p.55). Community representatives were to be nominated by parents and elected by the GB (ibid, section 6.32(f) p.55). For the powers and/or functions of the GBs, there were two major ones. The first, basic powers, included 'non-essential' powers like the determination of a code of conduct, budget priorities, school times and time table, and also 'recommended powers' like school level curriculum choices (ibid, section 5.19, p.45). The second, negotiable powers, comprised those which provinces could provide on contract to schools or which schools could contract privately, for example, responsibility for electricity and water accounts (ibid, section 5.20).

With regard to funding, the committee proposed three options of school governance financing. The first option, referred to as 'minimalist-gradualist approach', was to use a gradual approach to transforming the existing patterns of school financing. This was to involve doing away with all the then existing State and State-aided School models by name, but allow most of the models (including the ex-Model C Schools) to continue functioning. The second option, the 'equitable school-based formula', was to be meant for equal per capita expenditure and to prohibit schools from raising additional moneys. And the third, 'partnership funding', included an equal per capita expenditure but reduced the state's commitment to operating costs, depending on parental contribution (Hunter Commission Report, sections 7.24-7.99, pp. 68-6-77). These options are given further clarification in the next chapter.

Following the recommendations of the Hunter Commission Report, WP2a emerged in November 1995 as the Ministry of Education's reaction. By and large, WP2a assented to the recommendations of the Hunter Commission Report (WP2a, 1995: sections 3-7, pp.15-36) with a significant change about community representation, which will be described in the next chapter.

After WP2a had emerged, the Ministry of Education invited comments from the public about the contents of the document. Based on the comments received, the Ministry accepted WP2a with a few changes and designated it White Paper 2 (hereafter referred to as WP2b) for publication in February 1996. The major changes concerned funding (ibid, section 5.24, p.33). These will be elaborated on in the next chapter.

Subsequent to WP2b, the SASB appeared in April 1996 in favour of many of the proposals of WP2b, for example, the composition and election of GBs (SASB, 1996: section 16-17, pp.15-18). However, the SASB embodied significant shifts about the role of the principal and community representation, as well as governance and funding. These will also be explicated in the subsequent chapter.

Finally, the SASA emerged in November 1996. A summary of its major themes as well as the shifts that occurred after the SASB have been presented in the next chapter. However, when the contents are examined critically, some tensions and contradictions are revealed. In this context, the micropolitics in schools, could impede the successful implementation of the SASA and for that matter, the realisation of its objectives. It is this hypothesis that stimulated an inquiry into the reaction of schools to the SASA. The subsequent chapter will present a summary and an analysis of the SASA.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **ANALYSIS OF KEY THEMES IN THE SASA**

The SASA consists of various elements. These include:

- compulsory attendance and exemption from compulsory attendance at school by children of school-going- age;
- freedom of conscience and religion at public schools; and
- establishment, registration and withdrawal from registration of independent schools;

However, the key themes are organisation, governance and funding of schools. In this chapter a summary of these themes is provided. An analysis of the themes, using a suitable conceptual framework, is made. Next, the implementation of the SASA by the Western Cape Province is analysed, showing the relationship between the State and the Provincial policy and how both policies are to operate at the school level.

### **3.1 Summary of the Key Themes**

#### ***Organisation of Schools***

The SASA categorises schools as *independent schools* or *public schools*. The Independent Schools category consists of all schools which, prior to the emergence of the SASA, were 'Private' or 'Independent' (cf: WP2b, section 2.3, p.13). Such schools register with their provincial education departments and comply with the conditions of registration laid down by their provinces (ibid: section 2.13, p.15; see also SASA: section 46, p.28).

The Public Schools category, as explained by WP2b (section 2(2.1), p.13) and the SASA (section 52(1), p.32) comprises all schools which, before the introduction of the SASA, were referred to as Community Schools, Farm Schools, and State-aided Schools (including other schools like church, Model C and Mine Schools).

Public schools have certain features in common: they represent partnerships between the provincial education department and the local community; they are funded wholly or largely from public resources, that is, from the budgets of the provincial education

department; their admission policies are determined by GBs in consultation with the provincial education departments, in terms of national norms and provincial regulations; they uphold constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms; their mission, policy, and character or ethos, are determined within national and provincial frameworks by governing bodies comprising elected representatives of the main stakeholders of the schools; their teachers are appointed by the provincial education department on the recommendation of and in consultation with the schools' GBs; and salaries of the teachers are paid by the provincial education department according to a staff provisioning scale (WP2b, section 2.9, p.14).

According to the SASA "a public school may be an ordinary public school or a public school for learners with special education needs" (section 12(3), p.10). This study concentrates on ordinary public schools. Hence, the subsequent analysis, which basically deals with governance and funding, will be based on ordinary public schools.

### ***Governance of Ordinary Public Schools***

In terms of governance, the SASA requires every school to have a GB which will be responsible for the governance of the school headed by a principal who undertakes the professional management of the school under the authority of the provincial Head of the Education Department (HOD)<sup>1</sup> (section 16). In ordinary public schools the membership of the GB should comprise the principal of the school in his/her official capacity, elected members consisting of the educating and non-educating staff of the school, learners' parents who are not employed at the school, and learners in the eighth grade or higher at the school elected by the representative council of learners at the school) (section 23(2), p.18). In addition to these members, the GB is allowed to co-opt a member or members of the community to assist it in discharging its functions. However, co-opted members do not have voting rights on the GB. In terms of numbers, "the number of parent members must comprise one more than the combined total of other members who have voting rights" (section 23(6-9) p.18).

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<sup>1</sup> Head of Department, as defined by the SASA (p.4), means the head of an education department established by section 7(2) of the national Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation No. 103 of 1994), who is responsible for education in a province. The (HOD) is a subordinate of the member of the Executive Council who is responsible for education in that province.

Conditions for the election of members of the GB are determined by notice in the Provincial Gazette by the Member of the Executive Council (the MEC)<sup>2</sup> responsible for education in the Western Cape. The conditions include the determination of-  
the term of office of members and office-bearers of a governing body;

- the designation of an officer to conduct the process of the nomination and election of members of the governing body;
- guidelines for the achievement of the highest practicable level of representativity of members of the governing body;
- a formula or formulae for the calculation of the number of members of the governing body to be elected in each of the categories referred to in section 23(2) [above], but such formula or formulae must provide reasonable representation for each category and must be capable of application to the different sizes and circumstances of public schools. (section 28, p.20).

Once a GB is established, it must, from amongst its members, elect office-bearers who must include at least a chairperson who should be a parent member of the governing body and who is not employed at the school, as well as a treasurer and a secretary (section 29). The term of office of such office-bearers may not exceed one year, though an office-bearer may be re-elected or co-opted after the expiry of the term of office (section 31(3-4), p22).

The GB may also establish committees including an executive committee, and in addition to appointing a member of the GB to each committee, appoint (i.e. co-opt) persons who are not members of the GB to such committees on grounds of expertise (section 30(1), p.22). Such persons will not have voting rights, as in the case of the co-opted members of the GB.

Training of the GB is deemed necessary by the Ministry of Education and so the SASA requires funds to be appropriated by the provincial legislature, out of which the HOD must establish a programme to provide not only introductory training for the newly elected GB members to enable them to perform their functions competently, but also continuing training to GBs to promote the effective performance of their functions or to

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<sup>2</sup> the MEC refers to the Member of the Executive Council of a province who is responsible for education in that province.

enable them to assume additional functions. It is also required that the HOD makes principals and other officers of the education department render the requisite assistance to in the performance of their functions in terms of the SASA (section 19, p.14).

The SASA specifies two types of functions: “functions of all governing bodies” and “allocated functions of governing bodies”.

*Functions of all governing bodies* include the adoption of a constitution for the school; recommendations to the HOD for the appointment of staff at the school; administration and control of the school’s property, buildings and grounds; and the discharging of other functions consistent with the SASA, as determined by the Minister of Education by notice in the Government Gazette, or by the MEC by notice in the Provincial Gazette (section 20, pp. 14-16). As an additional function, section 5 (pages 6 and 8) of the SASA places the admission policy of schools in the hands of the GBs and stipulates that there should not be unfair discrimination of admission of learners to public schools (subsection 1), and GBs of such schools may not administer any test related to the admission of learners, or direct or authorise the principals of such schools or any other person to administer such test (subsection 2). Further, the SASA stipulates that a learner whose parent is unable to pay or has not paid the school fees determined by the GB (section 39(2)b, p.26) or does not subscribe to the mission statement of the school, or has refused to enter into a contract in terms of which such parent waives any claim for damages resulting from the education of the learner, may not be refused admission to the school (section 5(3)). To strengthen these admission laws, the SASA requires applications for the admission of learners to public schools to be forwarded to the education department in a manner determined by the HOD, who must inform the parent in writing if the application is refused and the reason for the refusal (section 5 (7-8)). Room has also been created for parents to appeal to the Member of the Executive Council responsible for education in the province (the MEC) if the learners are refused admission (section 5(9)).

For the *allocated functions*, the option has been given to GBs to apply to the HOD in writing to be allocated functions which include the maintenance and improvement of

the school's property, and buildings and grounds occupied by the school and, also, the determination of the extra-mural curriculum of the school, as well as purchasing of textbooks, educational materials or equipment for the school (section 21 (1) p.16). However, if the HOD considers the GB incapable of performing such functions effectively, he/she may refuse the application. The HOD also has the option to approve the application unconditionally or subject to condition(s). It is required that the HOD communicates whatever decision he/she takes on the application to the GB with reasons, and room is provided for any person aggrieved by the decision of the HOD to appeal to the MEC (section 21(2-5) p.16). Besides those functions that the GBs have the option to apply for, the MEC may, on grounds of capacity of the GB and on a reasonable and equitable basis, allow some GBs (by notice in the Provincial Gazette) to perform one or more functions without making an application (section 21(6), p.16).

For proper functioning of the GBs, the SASA requires every GB of a public school to function in terms of a constitution (of which a copy should be sent to the HOD within 90 days of their election) which complies with minimum requirements determined by the MEC by notice in the Provincial Gazette and which provides for *inter alia* the following:

- meeting of the governing body at least once every school term;
- recording and keeping of minutes of governing body meetings; *and*
- rendering a report on its activities to parents, learners, educators and other staff of the school at least once a year (section 18, p.14).

Further, the HOD has been given the power to withdraw a function from a GB on reasonable grounds after informing the GB of his/her intention to do so and after granting the GB a reasonable opportunity to make representations to him/her relating to the intention, and also after giving due consideration to any such representations received. Moreover, the HOD may reverse or suspend his/her action for sufficient reasons and any one aggrieved by a decision of the HOD could appeal to the MEC against the decision (section 22, p.18).



Members of GBs do not enjoy any kind of remuneration for the performance of their duties, though they are reimbursed for necessary expenses they incur in the performance of their duties (section 27, p.20).

### ***Funding of Ordinary Public Schools***

Another major theme in the SASA is funding. According to the SASA, the state is responsible for funding public schools from public revenue on an equitable basis in order to ensure the proper exercise of the learners' rights to education and the redress of past injustices in the provision of education (section 34(1), p.24). In this regard the "governing body of a public school must take all reasonable measures within its means to supplement the resources supplied by the State in order to improve the quality of education provided by the school to all learners at the school" (section 36, p.24).

One such measure is the implementation of a resolution, providing for the amount of fees to be charged and for equitable criteria and procedures for the total, partial or conditional exemption of parents who are unable to pay school fees (section 39(1-2), p.26). Such a resolution must be adopted by a majority of parents at a meeting of parents convened on at least 30 days' notice (section 39(3), p.26).

To ensure the efficacy of the resolution, the SASA provides means of ensuring that fees are paid by allowing GBs to enforce (by process of law) the payment of school fees by parents who are liable to pay, unless or to the extent that such parents have been exempted from the payment (section 40(1), *ibid*). However, a parent has the right to appeal to the HOD against a decision of a GB (regarding the exemption of such parent). In deciding an appeal of this nature, the HOD must follow due process which safeguards the interest of the parent and the GB (section 40(2-3), p.26).

Another measure is the establishment of a school fund, which should be administered in accordance with directions issued by the HOD. For this fund, a banking account must be opened and maintained and any money received by the school including school fees and voluntary contributions paid into it (section 37(1-3), p.24). To ensure proper utilisation, the SASA stipulates that school funds and proceeds thereof as well as any

other assets of the school should be used only for educational purposes such as assisting the performance of the functions of the GB or any other educational purpose agreed between the GB and the HOD (section 37(6), p.24).

Annual budgets are to be prepared in accordance with guidelines determined by the MEC, which shows the estimated income and expenditure of the school for the subsequent financial year. Before such budgets are approved by the GB they should be presented to a general meeting of parents for consideration and approval by a majority of parents present and voting, provided at least 30 days' notice is given (sect. 38, p.24).

Records of funds received and spent by the school and of its assets, liabilities and financial transactions, must be kept; and annual financial statements must be drawn up in accordance with guidelines provided by the MEC, as soon as practicable, but not later than three months after the end of each financial year (section 42, p.26).

Finally, a registered accountant and auditor in terms of the Public Accountants and Auditors Act, 1991 (Act No. 80 of 1991) or a person qualified to perform the duties of accounting officer in terms of section 60 of the Close Corporation Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984) or any person approved by the MEC for this purpose should be appointed to audit the records and financial statement, provided the MEC does not deem it necessary to request the Auditor-General to do so. Within six months after the end of each financial year, a copy of the annual financial statements, audited or examined, should be submitted to the HOD (section 43(1-5), p.26). And at the request of an interested person, the GB must make the records referred to above (in section 42), and the audited or examined financial statements referred to in this section (i.e. section 43) available for inspection.

According to the SASA the above themes are to be put into effect, *inter alia*, to ensure democracy and to redress past injustices and inequalities. With reference to these principles, the following section presents an analysis of the themes. To start with, however, the conceptual framework for this analysis will be described.

### 3.2 The Analysis

There are different ways of conceptualising and/or analysing educational policy. For example, Haddad (1995: 18) conceives of it as “an explicit or implicit single decision which may set out directives for guiding future decisions, initiate or retard action, or guide implementation of previous decisions”. He goes on to say that policy processes involve analysing the existing situation, generating policy options, evaluating policy options, making the policy decision, planning for policy implementation, implementing the policy, assessing the impact of the policy, and generating a new policy cycle that results from the policy impact assessment. Anderson (1984) also sees policy as moving sequentially from problem formulation, policy agenda, policy formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation (in Scribner and Layton, 1995:111).

Thus policy generally involves decision-making, following an analysis of the contemporary situation, making a suitable decision, implementing the decision, as well as evaluating and generating a new policy.

The above models provide a clear picture of the stages through which policies go. However, they are not suitable to the aims of the analysis presented in this work because they are not really causal. In other words they do not explain or predict how various stages of policy may be linked. As a result, they have a limited use for building a theory which links attributes of the policy process to outputs and outcomes (cf: Scribner and Layton, 1995: 11). Furthermore, although these models do provide an overview of the stages of policy formulation, this research is concerned with evaluating the policy in action. Hence the following framework will be used for the analysis.

#### 3.2.1 *Conceptual Framework for the Analysis*

Ball's model of policy analysis will be used to analyse the key themes in the SASA. This is done to provide a frame for understanding the tensions within policy, tensions which are played out on the micro-political level within schools.

Ball provides two conceptualisations of policy: 'Policy as Text' and 'Policy as Discourse'. *Policy as text* “involves the agency side of policy work” (Henry,

1993:102). In Ball's words: "[if we place ourselves] somewhat under the influence of literary theory, we can see policies as representations which are encoded in complex ways (via struggles, compromises, authoritative public interpretations and reinterpretations) and decoded in complex ways (via actors' interpretations and meanings in relation to their history, experiences, skills, resources and context)" (Ball, 1994: 16). Thus policy as text describes the ways in which policies are written in various ways by various people, read in a variety of settings, interpreted, reinterpreted and recontextualised through contestations, compromises, "negotiation[s] and serendipity", and in relation to the "actors' history, experiences, skills, resources and context" (ibid). This explains why policies shift from time to time and why "policy processes are inherently messy, ambiguous, unpredictable and conflict-provoking" (Henry, 1993: 102).

*Policy as discourse*, on the other hand, describes the way in which both the state and its citizenry are constructed or directed by policies under "a system of practices...and a set of values and ethics" (Ball, 1994: 22). Henry articulates Ball's interpretation of policy as discourse thus:

'policy as discourse' places policy within 'the big picture' of constraint. Discourses frame 'what can be said and thought' at any given time and establish 'discursive limitations': "We read and respond to policies in discursive circumstances that we cannot, or perhaps do not, think about" (Henry, 1993: 102).

Thus as a society, we are framed by discourses; discourses control our thinking and do so in ways that we might not be aware of. As Ball puts it:

We do not speak a discourse; it speaks us. *We are* the subjectivities, the voices, the knowledge, the power relations that a discourse constructs and allows. We do not 'know' what we say, we 'are' what we say and do. In these terms we are spoken by policies, we take up the positions constructed for us within policies (Ball, op. cit.: 22).

Ball speaks of "us", meaning that both the citizenry and the State (the policy maker/actor) are "the product of discourse" (ibid). Here, no actor enjoys absolute

power: “power is not totally entrusted to someone who would exercise it alone, over others, in an absolute fashion; ... everyone is caught, those who exercise power as well as those who are subjected to it” (Foucault, 1977:156; in Gillborn, 1994:161). For this reason the effects of policies are so significant.

Acknowledging the effects of policies and the significance of these effects, Ball, besides conceptualising policy as text and as discourse, notes that “policies from ‘above’ are not the only constraints and influences upon institutional practice” (1994: 24). In this regard, Ball describes policy as cyclical rather than linear, and the policy process itself as complex. The reason is that policy is an evolutionary process, for it is possible for practitioners to implement policy for a purpose that was not originally intended by policy writers. Through contestations and compromises a policy could be recontextualised and/or changed to reflect values, experiences and histories.

Ball, Bowe and Gold (1992:19) therefore envision three major policy contexts: the contexts of influence, the context of policy text production, and the context of practice (or implementation). The *context of influence* examines where policy is initiated and where and how policy discourses are constructed in public and private ways. The *context of policy text production* considers the ways in which policy is represented in textual form, paying attention to factors such as timing, the language used as well as textual coherence or incoherence within or between texts. The *context of practice* is the arena where policy texts are acted on and interpreted by practitioners with their own histories and experiences. It is this third context - the context of practice - that this study dwells on to investigate the reaction from the school level to the SASA.

It is worth noting, however, that Ball’s notion of policy analysis has also been subjected to criticisms. For example, Henry criticises the dichotomy between ‘policy as text’ and ‘policy as discourse’ and says, in reality, the two do not oppose each other: “text and discourse clearly operate in relation rather than in opposition to each other” (1993:102). For Hatcher and Troyna (1994), Ball underplays the coercive dimension and ability of the state to control policy outcomes. They also criticise Ball’s concept of policy as text and argue that the analogy between literary texts and state policy documents is

inappropriate, as the former is discursive and the latter non-discursive. To them, policy texts have to be put into practice in real life institutions in order to work and so the state, the actor, can impose interpretation at the level of discourse and thus has power to translate readings (or policies) into practice.

Notwithstanding the criticisms, Ball's theoretical explanation of policy analysis offers a suitable framework for analysing the SASA, for it creates room for tracing the shifts in educational policies prior to the birth of the SASA (using the concept of policy as text). Also, it assists in discussing the discourses of the SASA (using the concept of policy as discourse). More importantly, both concepts, with their emphasis on policy effects, provide a useful tool for investigating the reaction from the school level to the SASA.

### ***3.2.2 Application of the Framework***

Using Ball's conception of policy as text and policy as discourse, the following analysis could be made.

#### ***Policy as Text***

The contents of the series of four policy texts that underwent "encoding" and "decoding" (cf: explanation of Ball's concept of policy as text) and finally led to the appearance of the SASA have been outlined in Chapter 2. In the outline, it was noted that the Hunter Commission Report recommended the establishment of two types of schools - public and independent - to replace the previous models of State, Community, Farm, State-aided and Private Schools (section 5.13, p.44), in order to establish a unitary system of education and uphold basic principles like equity, redress, quality and efficiency. This recommendation remains in all the policy texts.

However, in respect of the structure of GB of public schools, there have been significant shifts about community representatives and parental participation, even though the categories of members have remained consistent throughout the policy texts (Hunter Commission: section 6.27; WP2a: section 4.12; WP2b: section 3.11; SASB: section 16; SASA: section 23). Community representatives, according to the Hunter Commission Report, were to be nominated by parents and elected by the GB (1995:

section 6.32(f), p.55). But in WP2a (1995: section 4.12(3), p.20) and WP2b (section 3.38(5), p.23) they were to be (s)electd *only* by the GB in order to ensure that community representatives are acceptable to all school-based constituencies. A change occurred again in the SASB because this time they were to be co-opted with voting rights by the GB (1996: section 16.1(f), p.15). The SASA accepted this change (section 23(6), p.18) but said “co-opted members do not have voting rights on the *governing body*” (section 23(8), p.18). These shifts have been analysed below (see discourse). For the moment it is worth noting their significance because in terms of community representation, they indicate an eroding of democratic principles that include robust civil participation on which the education system was to be designed, as recommended from the outset by the Hunter Commission Report (section, 6.1-6.5). Since the Hunter Commission recommendations, there have been changes in the status and changes in the meanings of the status of community representatives through WP2a, WP2b, the SASB and to the SASA. Currently, stakeholders (community representatives) are allowed the right to participate with weakened authority, for they cannot vote to put their contributions into reality. According to Sayed (1997a: 10) this is tantamount to “regulated participation” by the State (“a process by which broad-based participation by communities and stakeholders is affirmed, but places limits or regulates the nature of the interaction”), a position that assumes that agents of civil society will govern for their individual self-interest and not for the common good and therefore it is the State that always represents the common good (ibid). This conforms with Ball’s concept that “policies shift and change their meanings ... [because they] ... are represented differently by different actors and interests” (1994: 16).

The principle of regulated participation is carried further with respect to parental participation. The Hunter Commission Report (section 6.29, p.55), WP2a (section 4.12(2) p.20), WP2b (section 3.15, p.16) and the SASB (section 16(2), p15) agree that parents should form the majority of the GB. The SASA accentuates this: “the number of parent members must comprise one more than the combined total of other members of a *governing body* who have voting rights” (section 23(9), p.18). Besides, only parents may serve as the chairpersons of the GB (section 29(2), p.22). The reason is that “parents have most at stake in the education of their children....” (WP2b: section

3.15, p.18). In other words, since parents are the most important stakeholders, they are expected to make serious legal and financial decisions for which GBs will be responsible (*ibid*). This privilege that has been granted to parents has implications which will be discussed under powers and functions of the GB in the next two pages.

In terms of the powers and functions, the basic powers and the negotiable powers outlined in the Hunter Commission (sections 6.37-6.40, pp.56-58) (cf: evolution of SASA, Chapter 2) have remained in all the policy texts but with a few changes (cf: WP2a, sections 4.20-4.38, pp.22-25; WP2b: sections 3.17-3.23, pp.18-20; SASB sections 13-14, pp.10-12; SASA: sections 20-21, 14-16). The basic powers have been reduced and linked to a “handing over notion” of policy making (Samoff, 1996:6). For example, WP2b recommends a ‘menu’ of powers from which GBs can choose. These include broad policy powers like developing the school’s mission, goals and objectives; personnel powers like appointment of teachers in consultation with the provincial department; and powers on curriculum matters including extra-mural curricula. However, the provincial education departments are to decide which of the functions GBs can assume control of, depending on such factors as capacity (WP2b, section 3.21, pp.18-19). The SASB and the SASA also limit the powers and functions of the GB for in terms of the allocated functions, the GB has to apply to the provincial government to be given the powers (SASB, section 15, p.13 & SASA, sections 20-21, pp.14-16).

Once again, as a consequence of the shifts, participation has been regulated and decision-making powers redefined and limited. One finds that important stakeholders have been allotted the right to participate but with weakened authority. Hence according to Ball’s notion of policy as text “policies have their own momentum inside the state; purposes and intentions are reworked and reoriented over time” (1994: 17). Thus as a result of the State’s perceived need of capacity building and developing a uniform system of education, roles of GBs have become limited; developing a sense of state education out of the divided past is being prioritised over empowerment and democratising educational governance.



Major shifts could also be identified in school financing. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Hunter Commission suggested three options of school financing (Hunter Commission: sections 7.22-7.61, pp.68-77). The first, 'the Minimalist-Gradualist Approach', was to adopt a gradual approach to transforming the then existing State and State-aided School models by name, but to allow most of the models (including the ex-Model C schools) to continue functioning. Thus schools would be rendered (replicas of) Model C through the introduction of gradual means like equitable distribution of staff and other resources (ibid: sections 7.24-7.30, pp.68-70).

The second option, 'The Equitable School-based Formula Approach', was similar to the Minimalist Gradualist Approach, but equal per capita allocation to each learner would be made. This per capita amount would in turn be supplemented, depending on affirmative action needs and factors like school location. However, the approach prohibited schools from raising additional moneys (sections 7.31-7.37, pp.70-71).

The third option, the 'Partnership Approach', involved partnership between the State and the community/parents in order to balance equity, redress, quality, and efficiency. According to this approach, provincial budgets are to be divided into capital needs, core resources (example, supervision and administration), redress issues, and operating costs (example, maintenance and learning materials). School moneys would be allocated according to need by the provincial government, and parental contribution would be based on a sliding scale of financial ability. The idea behind this is to create additional funds to whatever parents would supply for the State to utilise and thus begin to address the question of redress (sections 7.38-7.61, pp.72-77).

Even though the Hunter Commission considers the Partnership Approach the most advantageous (in view of the fact that it allays the fears of the Model C school community, and addresses questions of equity and redress), all the approaches are rejected by WP2b, the SASB and the SASA in favour of a fourth option referred to as Middle Class Mandatory Fee Clustering (MMFC) (Sayed, 1997b: 724). In the case of the Minimalist Gradualist Approach, the reason for the rejection is that it "would not redistribute resources sufficiently to make a tangible difference to the majority of

under-resourced schools .... Access to free and compulsory schooling would be available only in the poorest, low quality schools” (WP2b, section 5.13, p. 31). For the equitable school-based formula approach, the reasons for the rejection included the fact that it could have a fatal consequence because the decline in public funding for the previously privileged schools would propel middle-class parents, (some of who are opinion-formers and decision-makers who have influence in favour of sustained or enhanced public funding for public education) out of the Public School sector into the Private School sector (WP2b: section 5.24, p.33) and that questions of equity, quality and fiscal sustainability could not be addressed by considering the method of allocating public funding sources on its own, but must also “consider the effect of the availability and distribution of state funding on the capacity and willingness of parents to contribute from their private means to support public schools” (SASB: 58, par. 27, p.58). In respect of the Partnership Approach, though it was seen to have advantages as mentioned, the review committee considered that “because of the complexity of assessing family incomes, determining fee structures, and managing a more flexible and creative provincial planning and budgeting system” the administrative difficulties would be too great (WP2b, section 5.20, p.32). On the other hand, the MMFC was accepted because all students in public schools would attract the same per capita expenditure, and school GBs, following an accepted procedure, would be able to raise additional user fees to subvent the formula, so as to prevent the middle class (Model C school parents) from fleeing the state sector (WP2b, section 5.25-5.26, pp.33-34).

Hence, what weighs heavily in the decision about funding is the issue of redress and equity. The government recognises the import of addressing past inequalities and discriminatory practices through strategies of redress, but at the same time it needs to develop norms and standards of equity so that no group is advantaged over the other. At length, what emerges in the SASA is the exemption in the payment of fees, which as explicated under ‘discourse’ below, does not prevent inequities. Hence, Ball notes that “policy is not exterior to inequalities, although it may change them, it is also affected, influenced and deflected by them” (1994: 17). Thus if the government wants to address the past inequalities and provide a suitable framework for democracy in the education sector, then the question arises as to why redress is not being sufficiently addressed and

why the powers of the governing bodies have been reduced. It is these loopholes which have been given further explication under the sub-heading below: *discourses*.

***Discourses:***

Ball's conception of policy as discourse is also reflected in the SASA. In this concept, Ball notes that "a system of practices ... and a set of values and ethics" provide direction for action. Similarly, some discourses embedded in the SASA, for example, decentralisation and participation, have provided direction for specific policy choices which present tensions and contradictions in the text. These tensions and contradictions will be highlighted and the bases for the discourses discussed.

- ***Tensions and Contradictions in the SASA***

The tensions and contradictions become more visible when the values and principles expressed in words like liberty, equality, justice and democracy in the SASA are explicated.

In the SASA, liberty is enshrined in a number of places. For example, there is freedom of conscience and religion, and cultural diversity is respected in the provision relating to non-discrimination in the choice of language for schools (sections 6 and 7, p.8).

Equality also finds expression in the stress on the constitutional right to education and non-discriminatory admissions to schools (section 5, pp. 6 and 8) as well as the provision of education according to uniform norms and standards (cf. preamble).

A notion of justice, in addition to equality, is given prominence through the use of the term "equitable" which also finds expression in the importance given to "fund[ing] public schools from public revenue on an equitable basis in order to ensure the proper exercise of the rights of learners to education and the redress of past inequalities in education provision" (section 34(1), p.24) and determining "equitable criteria and procedures for the total, partial or conditional exemption of parents who are unable to pay school fees (section 39(2b), p.26).

Democracy has now become a core value. The traditional governance structure of schools in the apartheid era which was unfairly representative, as well as the role of participants in the structure which was purely advisory and consultative with no substantive powers, has shifted in order to broaden the base of management and promote participation. This time, “the governance of every public school is vested in its governing body” (section 16(1), p.14) and their acceptance of responsibility for the organisation ... and funding of schools in partnership with the State” is highlighted (cf. the preamble).

The above principles may sound laudable in theory. However, with reference to funding and governance, the way the principles are to be applied (in practice) presents some tensions and contradictions.

In terms of funding there is tension between financing education in a way that will ensure equity (i.e. fairness, so that there is equality) and financing education in a way that will compensate for the inequalities created in the apartheid era. The Hunter Commission expressed an example of this tension:

[*Equity* must be embedded] into the system of school governance and funding. This concept of equity assumes that equal treatment of the unequal is not necessarily equitable, and requires an approach which takes into account the need to provide a basis for treating people equally in order to ensure equity.

[The value of *redress*] draws on the issue of equity and requires that specific unequal treatment be arranged to ensure that those handicapped by the prejudicial policies of the past receive a share of the resources which enable them to make up the backlogs which are a consequence of that past (Hunter Commission Report, par. 5.6(a-b), p.42).

Thus while ensuring that the issue of redress is not left out of consideration, there is also the claim for funding school “on an equitable basis in order to ensure the proper exercise of the rights of learners to education” (SASA: 24, section 34(1) p.24). This is where the tension arises, for while equity implies that no persons will be advantaged, compensation for inequalities created by apartheid connotes that the historically disadvantaged group would be targeted above others - a system which, in reality, is

tantamount to inequality. This tension is discernible from the funding option mentioned earlier, namely, the MMFC.

The MMFC maintains the commitment to a uniform formulae-based system of funding, though schools would be able to raise additional moneys to assist those who are unable to pay fees to still have the right to education. But this method is likely to perpetuate inequity because by making provision “for total, partial or conditional exemption of parents who are unable to pay school fees”, GBs may be inclined to attract those who can pay in order to ‘fill-up’ the school and refuse admission to those who cannot afford to pay. Therefore in reality MMFC sets up that drive certain GBs towards securing a more prosperous and privileged parent community at the expense of the disadvantaged. An aspect of this study, therefore, is to investigate whether the interest of those who are unable to pay are being safeguarded.

There are also tensions and contradictions relating to school governance. In devolved school governance, the fundamental principle is to *inter alia* enhance participation and involvement in educational decision-making and thereby create a democratic system of governance. However, the SASA seems to relegate this principle to the background. The reason is that participation has been rendered mere ‘representation’ because if even the participants have powers, the conditions under which such powers can be exercised have been restricted. For example, apart from those functions allocated to GBs, the SASA requires them to “discharge other functions consistent with [the SASA] as determined by the Minister by notice....” (SASA: section 20(m), p.16). Thus for major issues such as determination of the extra-mural curriculum of the school and the choice of subject options, decisions have to be taken in terms of provincial curriculum policy (ibid: section 21 (b)). Decisions which do not require consultation with the Minister or other higher authorities are over minor issues. For example, they can “encourage parents, learners, educators and other staff at the school to render voluntary services to the school” (ibid: section 20(h)). Thus the SASA and the other texts do not extend the logic of participation and for that matter democracy to the fullest; they have retained policy power for the central and provincial authorities and merely transferred

implementation powers to the GBs. The question as to whether governing bodies are happy about this is worthy of investigation but will not form part of this study.

A further tension relates to parental participation in school governance. The SASA gives parents more power than other categories of members of the GB by proposing that parents should constitute the majority on school governance structures. The problem associated with this approach is that parental choice has been made central and crucial to school governance in order to ensure democracy. This means that the rights of a particular group of citizens (e.g. parents) have been elevated while those of others (e.g. teachers and students) have been relegated. The reaction of the other category of members to this is worth being investigated.

Moreover, according to the SASA “a governing body of a public school may co-opt a member or members of the community to assist it in discharging its functions” (section 23(6) p.18) but “co-opted members do not have voting rights on the governing body” (section 23(8) p.18). Given the notion that the reason for “the decision to bring all present varieties of public sector schools into a single broad category of public school...is to ...enable a spirit of partnership between provincial education authorities and local communities to thrive” (WP2b: section 2.8, p.14) and to ensure that there will be a “combination of powers and functions which best reflects the capacity-building and *will* of the community, and the policy priorities and accountability of the provincial authorities” (ibid; my emphasis), the question as to whether community representatives have the right to decide policy and how they will do so in order ensure liberty, equality, justice and democracy also remain unanswered.

Obviously then, the SASA is not devoid of tensions and contradictions. However, it is significant to note that these tensions and contradiction have not occurred in a vacuum, for discourses such as decentralisation and participation embedded in the SASA explain why specific policy choices surface.

In the case of decentralisation, power has been devolved to the GBs over minor issues and original powers are retained by the national and provincial ministries especially

over major issues like curricula because a decentralised system of governance in terms of major issues might introduce into the process of regulation and allocation, agendas and interests such as those of parents and local communities which may not be in the best interest of the State. Therefore the State decides on curriculum, for example, to ensure that qualifications and examinations are reasonably similar across the subnational, national and international units so as to facilitate mobility, the exchange of personnel and the mutual recognition of certificates across different regions and countries (cf: Weiler, 1989:33-34).

Similarly, regarding the discourse of participation, the SASA has been constructed to regulate participation by placing constraints on the decision making powers of primary stakeholders so that local level decisions will not infringe on state policy and hinder the management strategies of the state.

However, Weiler notes that decentralised structures can result in the mobilisation of resources that would not be available under strict centralised conditions (1989; 35). This discourse is considered relevant to the State's economy and so it has been adopted in order to tap capital and use it effectively. Thus in developing a plan for funding public education and dealing with the redress of past inequalities, the State realises that money is not available to immediately correct the effects of discriminatory practices. At the same time it cannot maintain the past system where the underprivileged will be denied quality education because they are not able to provide adequate resources. Consequently, governing bodies have been allowed to charge school fees despite the rhetoric of 'free schooling' and 'open access'.

Notwithstanding the reasons underlying the tensions and contradictions, it is felt that the micropolitics of schools could further impede the successful implementation of the reforms that the SASA seeks to achieve. Chapter 5 will consider whether the SASA is actually able to override micro-political power at the school level and maintain its procedures for addressing issues of equity, equality and democratisation of educational governance and funding. For the moment, the subsequent section will provide an analysis of the implementation of the SASA by the Western Cape Province, showing

the relationship between the state and the provincial policy and how it is to operate at the school level.

### **3.3 Implementation of the SASA by the Western Cape Province.**

The constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act No. 200 of 1993) allows concurrent legislative power (provincial and national) with regard to all aspects relating to school education. As such there could be provincial and national laws applicable to issues of school ownership, governance and funding in one province, which section 126(5) of the constitution requires to be interpreted “as being consistent with each other, unless, and only to the extent that, they are, expressly or by necessary implication, inconsistent with each other”, and of which section 126(3) of the same constitution allows the provincial law to take precedence over the national one provided the latter-

- deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by provincial legislation;
- deals with a matter that, to be performed effectively, requires to be regulated or co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards that apply generally throughout the Republic;
- is necessary to set minimum standards across the nation for the rendering of public services;
- is necessary for the maintenance of economic unity, the protection of the environment , the promotion of interprovincial commerce, the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital or labour, or the maintenance of national security; or interests of another province or the country as a whole, [sic] or impedes the implementation of national economic policies.”

(Hunter Commission, 1995: 35).

Consequently, a critical examination of the Western Cape Provincial School Education Act No. 12 of 1997 (hereafter referred to as the Provincial Gazette Extraordinary or PGE for short), reveals that the Western Cape Province has gone through the entire policy process of the SASA and formulated its own education policy within the framework of the SASA. With reference to the provisions of the PGE, this section provides an analysis of the implementation of the provisions of the SASA by the



Western Cape Province. The analysis is centred on organisation, governance and funding of (public) schools in the Province.

### ***Organisation of Schools***

With regard to organisation of schools the PGE is consistent with the SASA, for just like the SASA (sections 12(1-3), p10 and 45-46(1-3), p.28) the PGE provides two categories of schools: Public Schools and Independent Schools (sections 12, p.14; 27 & 28, p.22). Since this study looks at ordinary public schools, the governance and funding procedures of only *these schools* in the PGE are considered.

### ***Governance of Public Schools***

PGE (section 13, p.16) conforms to the SASA (section 16, p.14) by vesting the governance of every public school in its GB, which membership includes the principal to whom the HOD (who is vested with the professional management of the school) must delegate such powers that are required for the effective professional management of the school. In addition, in order to enhance the capacity of the GBs, the PGE (section 6, p.8) conforms to the provisions of the SASA (section 19, p.14) about the appropriation of funds for the establishment of a programme by the HOD for introductory and continuing training of GBs.

The MEC establishes the GB for the public school (PGE section 21, p.20) as prescribed by the SASA (section 28, p.20) and may make regulations regarding:

- the composition and functions of governing bodies;
- the qualifications for appointment, designation or election as, the terms of office of, and the vacation of their offices by, members of governing bodies and the filling of casual vacancies in governing bodies;
- the manner of election, functions of chairpersons, treasurers and secretaries of governing bodies;
- the convening of, procedure and rules at, and quorum for, meetings of governing bodies and committees of governing bodies and the keeping of minutes of such meetings; *and*
- the dissolution and recomposition of governing bodies.

(PGE: section 24(1), p.20).

Specific regulations relating to the above have been stipulated by the SASA and these have been outlined in the previous section of this chapter (cf: summary of key themes of the SASA). For the moment, what is significant here is the consistency in the categorisation and governance of schools, for it shows the extent to which the provincial legislation conforms with that of the State.

However, a few additions occur in areas concerning the convening of, procedure and rules at, and quorum for, meetings of GBs. Section 22 of the PGE adds to what the SASA stipulates about these by indicating that in the absence of the chairperson from a meeting of the GB, the members who form a quorum (one more than half of the total number, as subsection 3 indicates) must elect any person from their number to preside at that meeting. To prevent the invalidation of the decisions taken at such meetings, the PGE further stipulates:

No decision taken by a governing body or action taken on the authority of a governing body shall be invalid merely by reason of the fact that a vacancy existed on that governing body or because a person who was not entitled to sit as a member of that governing body sat on that governing body as such a member, at the time when the decision was taken or the action was authorised, if the decision was taken or the action was authorised by one more than the half of the members of the governing body who were then present and entitled to sit as members (subsection 4, p.20).

There are further additions in terms of the SASA's provision (section 30(1), p.22) about the establishment of committee(s) by the GB. According to the PGE such committee(s) shall perform such functions as the GB determines and instructs (section 23(1) & (3), p.20) and that "a governing body shall not be divested of a function which in terms of this section has been assigned to a committee of that governing body" which also has the power to dissolve or recompose a committee it has established (section 23(4-5), p.20). Other additions occur in terms of funding. These mechanisms, add detail to the SASA and hopefully will provide for more effective running of GBs.

### ***Funding of Public Schools***

Sections 50 to 53 of the PGE demand the establishment of school funds, preparation of annual budgets, keeping of financial records and statements, and the auditing or examination of these records and statements as set down in the SASA (sections 37,38, 42 & 43, pp.24 & 26). Also Section 49 of the PGE sets down conditions for the payment of fees as contained in the SASA (sections 39 & 40, p.26). The conditions include the determination of fees to be charged and the equitable criteria and procedures for the total, partial or conditional exemption of parents unable to pay, by GBs (see p.23-24 of this work). However, in addition to these provisions, the PGE makes allowance for needy learners to have equal access to public schools:

The Member of the Executive Council may, out of moneys appropriated for this purpose by the Legislature, provide, on such basis and subject to such conditions as he or she may determine, with the concurrence of the financial head, financial or other material aid or financial as well as other material aid to needy learners admitted to a public school in order to allow such learners equal access to such public school (section 49(4), pp. 28-29).

These additions, together with those mentioned under governance of schools, appear because they concern issues which can be regulated effectively by the province and therefore do not require the State to set uniform standards about these across the nation (cf: Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: Act No. 200 of 1993, section 126(3); in Hunter Commission Report, paragraph 4.11-4.12, p.35).

It is significant to note, however, that a few differences occur between the SASA and the PGE. As argued by Sayed and Maharaj (1997:7), a greater percentage of the schools in the privileged sectors of the Western Cape are ex-Model C schools, so it appears the implementation of the SASA's provision about the "determination of school fees by the GB "would probably proceed smoother than other areas of the SASA which the Western Cape Province may not be so eager to embrace". This argument becomes clear when such areas like the *composition* and the *chair* of GB members as well as the *determination of school fees* in the SASA are compared with those in the PGE.

With regard to the composition of GBs, the SASA requires the number of parent members to be “one more than the combined total of other members of a GB who have voting rights” (section 23(9), p.18). On the other hand, PGE grants the MEC the prerogative to make “regulations as to the composition and [even] the functions of governing bodies” (section 24, p.20). Since schools are required to implement and act within the provisions of provincial legislation, they would be compelled to adopt the number of parents decided on by the MEC.

Concerning the chair of GB members, this has also been set down in the PGE in a way that can allow national legislation to be altered in practice. According to the SASA “only a parent member of a governing body who is not employed at the public school may serve as the chairperson of the governing body” (section 29(2), p.22). But the PGE leaves open the regulation about “the manner of election [and] functions of chairpersons ... of the GBs” with the MEC (section 24, subsection 1(c), p.20). Thus the PGE does not state specifically the category of members from which the chairperson should be elected. This is probably an indirect way of avoiding a situation where only parents would serve as chairpersons of GBs. The implication of this becomes evident when the PGE’s provision about the quorum for meetings of GBs is examined. The PGE stipulates:

The decision of one more than half of the number of a governing body present at a meeting of that governing body, constitutes a decision of that governing body, and in the event of an equality of votes, the person presiding at the meeting shall, in addition to his or her deliberative vote, have a casting vote (section 22(3), p.20).

These clauses of the PGE obviously create an opening for the development of tension and conflict resulting in internal dissension within school GBs. The reason is that depending on which person chairs the meeting and the member category of the person, there could be oscillations in the balance of power. Sayed and Maharaj note this when they say: “it is a weakness of both the SASA and the PGE that they have not anticipated the possibility of conflicts occurring in governing bodies and responded appropriately

by making provisions in regard to arbitration, mediation or other conflict resolution strategies” (1997: 8).

Undoubtedly then, the manner of implementation of a policy “takes on different forms and guises, different nuances and shades which result in substantial differences between the original intention of the policy and what actually happens in practice” (Sayed & Maharaj, 1997: 2). And as noted earlier, policy is not simply a matter of being written and then being passively received and implemented, for at all stages of the process, including the implementation stage, contestation and recontextualisation occur. It is for this reason that Rizve and Kemmis (1987: 21) note:

Those who participate in a program at the school level will interpret it in their own terms, in relation to their own understanding, desires, values and purposes, and in relation to the means available to them and the ways of those involved in a program.

And indeed, “we cannot predict or assume how [policies] will be acted on in every case in every setting, or what their immediate effect will be, or what room for manoeuvre actors will find for themselves” (Ball, 1994: 18). Hence, the next chapter presents the methodology for investigating how the SASA is acted upon in schools.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS**

#### **4.1 Methodology**

The fundamental assumption underpinning this investigation is that in the face of micropolitics in schools, the successful execution of the reforms that the SASA seeks to achieve could be hindered.

The purpose of this research, then, is to investigate how the micropolitics of school life impacts on the SASA.

Bless and Higson-Smith caution that “the choice of the type of research ... cannot be arbitrary” (1995: 42) because as explained by Yin (1994: 42) it depends on factors such as the nature of the research questions that are asked, the degree of the investigator’s control over behavioural events as well as the extent of focus on current as opposed to historical events. Therefore even though research strategies like correlational, explanatory, participatory, evaluation and action research exist<sup>1</sup>, exploratory research was chosen for this investigation.

Exploratory research, as explained by Bless and Higson-Smith, is used “to gain insight into a situation, phenomenon, community or person” (1995: 42). The purpose of this study is also to gain insight into the fate of the SASA in the face of micropolitical activities of the school. Moreover, as would be noted in the questionnaire, this study contains “familiar series questions” like (some types of) “what”, “how” and “why” questions suitable for exploratory research (see Yin, 1994: 5-9).

Two alternatives for designing exploratory research can be identified - *surveys* and *case studies*. Whereas the former is used to collect information over a broad range of cases, each case being studied only on the specific aspect under consideration, the latter is used to make a detailed and thorough investigation of a few cases (Bless & Higson-Smith, 1995: 43). This study deals with a single school therefore a *case study* is

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<sup>1</sup> For the description of these research strategies see Bless and Higson-Smith (1995), pp. 41-61.

considered more suitable than a survey, as the latter can merely reveal the main features of the micropolitics of the SASA, whereas the former will create room for examining in a much deeper way the roots of the micropolitics of the SASA and for describing how particular characteristics within the field of study favour or hinder the implementation of the SASA. However, even though

a case study observes the characteristics of an individual unit to probe deeply and to analyse intensively the phenomena that constitute the life cycle of the unit with a view to establishing generalisations about the wider population to which the unit belongs (Cohen and Marion, 1980: 99),

the results of this study may not be generalisable to all the schools in the Western Cape Province and the country at large, because the reaction of the participants of a historically advantaged school, for example, may be different from that of a historically disadvantaged school. Nonetheless, the findings may bear considerable relationship with other schools. And indeed, Gillborn argues that

By examining how policy changes are experienced and reconstructed at the micro level [in one school] we add to our understanding of the processes and dynamics of social change and offer the possibility of more informed, and effective, resistance to those exercises of power that seem likely to widen existing social inequalities (1994; 147).

## **4.2 Methods**

The field chosen for this study is Wesley Grammar School (a name coined to protect anonymity). This school was chosen for two major reasons.

Firstly, the school has demonstrated how micropolitics can work positively in a school in two ways. These were:

a) Political activity/co-operation: the school was established and located in a black township for the education of black children, but its teachers and students were able to march into the suburb of the city at a time when apartheid government was still in force, seize an abandoned building that had been used for the education of children with

special education needs and re-locate the school in the abandoned building with impunity. This is significant because it demonstrates the fact that micropolitics involves not only conflicting elements but also co-operative elements: people can build support among themselves to achieve their ends.

b) Pedagogical activity: the school has gained tremendous improvement in the matriculation examinations in the past couple of years. This demonstrates the effect of co-operative elements of micropolitics in the area of pedagogical action, for the school's results have improved through the group efforts of the teachers in terms of improved teaching performance (as this investigation has revealed). Given these previous instances it was considered interesting to see if and how this mobilisation would carry over into the application of the SASA.

Secondly, it was considered that examining the relationship between these micropolitical activities and the school environment would provide important insights into the way in which the SASA would be applied.

The research began with occasional visits to the school over a five month period. Initial visits in October/November 1997 were aimed at meeting some of the teachers, students and parents, in order to identify those who had been in the school for a couple of years before the inception of the SASA, and who would be reasonably acquainted with the school's history and, therefore, an important source of information. Secondly, the visits helped in determining the kind of instruments and sample that would be most suitable for the study.

Following the visits it was decided that a questionnaire - a set of questions having fixed wording, order of presentation, and more or less exact indications of how each question should be responded to (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995: 107) - would not be used. Although this instrument, as observed by Brown and Dowling (1997: 48), has several advantages such as its usefulness in "gathering simple information on *what people do or have done* and *what people know*" (example, adequate information for the period prior to the emergence of the SASA could have been elicited from all the old PTSA



members), it has, at the same time, several disadvantages. For example, the respondents may lack interest and misplace the questionnaire, thus, resulting in a low response rate or they would not have time to complete and return the questionnaire on time (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995: 112). Although the effect of this disadvantage could be minimised by increasing the sample, time constraints had to be taken into consideration.

Thus, given the limited time for the study, together with the problem of getting the parents on the GB, because of their usual absence at home and in Cape Town, it was found advisable to avoid the use of questionnaires. Consequently, available documents, interviews and observation were resorted to. The use of a combination of these “multiple sources of evidence”, referred to as “triangulation” (Yin, 1994: 91), was necessary in order to develop a “converging line of inquiry” that is likely to produce a reasonable amount of convincing and accurate data (ibid: 92). A description of how each of these was used, why they were used, how and why particular samples were chosen, and the problems encountered with each follows.

### **Documentation**

Available records from 1990 (when the school was established) to 1996 (when the SASA emerged) were compared with records of 1997-1998 in order to ascertain the changes at the school in terms of management and examination results, on account of the changes in governance and funding, following the emergence of the SASA.

Among the documents were staffing records. These were used to generate information about the staffing position of the school (the number of teachers, whether qualified or underqualified); their status (whether permanent or temporary); and how they were appointed and/or terminated. This was done to compare the influence of the PTSA on the appointment of staff between 1990 and 1996, and that of the GB in 1997 and 1998. Student registers were also used to get student numbers in order to find out whether the exemption in the payment of fees and the admission of students without discrimination as stipulated by the SASA, have influenced student population and performance.

## Problems

Some of the requisite records for comparing the activities of the school, from the period of its inception in the township through the period of its location in the city (white area) to the emergence of the SASA, in order to track the changes in governance and funding of the school were not available. Registers, minutes, constitution, and budgets, of the school from 1990-93 were nowhere to be found. Some records from 1994-98 were also incomplete and/or unreliable because, for example, there were insufficient indications of explanation about the changes in student numbers. Thus, there was no choice but to utilise the only available records and triangulation techniques (the collection of information from multiple sources, aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon (Yin, 1994: 92)).

## Interviews

Interviews involve a face-to-face contact with a person (participant or interviewee) who is made to respond to questions. For case study purposes, they serve as essential sources of evidence because as noted by Yin,

most case studies are about human affairs. These human affairs should be reported and interpreted through the eyes of specific interviewees, and well-informed respondents can provide important insights into a situation. They also can provide shortcuts to the prior history of the situation, helping you to identify other relevant sources of evidence (1995: 85).

Thus interviews were used for this study in view of the advantages inherent in them. The type of interviews used in this study were *non-scheduled structured interviews* as opposed to *scheduled structured interviews* (which are “based on an established questionnaire”) and *non-scheduled unstructured interviews* (which require respondents to comment on broadly defined issues) (Bless and Higson-Smith: 1995: 107).

The *non-scheduled structured interview* (*structured* because a list of questions to be investigated have to be prepared prior to the interview, and *non-scheduled* since the respondents are free to formulate other questions as considered appropriate for the prevailing situation) (ibid) was used because it was necessary to elicit specific and detailed information from the respondents in order to facilitate a comparison of the

reactions of the various member categories of the GB, viz: principal, teachers, students, and parents.

Five separate interviews were conducted: one each with the principal, one parent member, a student member, and two teacher members of the governing body. There was no interview with co-opted members because these are not represented on the body. In view of the difficulty of getting as many members of the GB as possible (as would be explained later) these separate interviews were considered a fair representation as each category of the GB (parents, teachers, students, the principal) was represented on the interviews. This gave room for proper analysis of the conflictual or different power relations that pattern the school's life.

All the members interviewed were on the ex-PTSA. This allowed a fair comparison of their roles in their previous and current memberships on the two bodies (the PTSA and the GB). Since the principal was not in the school from 1990-1993, the historical aspects of the interview (meant for her) of which she did not have idea, were conducted with one of the teachers present at the time.

All the interviews were conducted after school hours in order to avoid inconveniencing the interviewees. The principal and one teacher were interviewed at the school after classes, the other teacher at her home, and the student at the author's home. In the case of the parent, she was interviewed at her work place.

Two categories of interview schedules, one for the principal and the other for the other members of the GB, were used and these have been reproduced in the appendix. The salient difference in the two schedules is that the principal's contains additional questions about the history and the general professional management of the school, for which in her position as the head, it was felt she would be able to provide both adequate verbal and documentary evidence. For triangulation purposes, similar questions were asked of other interviewees.

The principal was interviewed first, followed by the student three days later. One male teacher was then interviewed a week later. After two weeks, a female teacher was interviewed. The day following this, the parent was interviewed. The interview with the principal took approximately one hour fifteen minutes, whereas the rest took approximately one hour each.

In designing the interview schedule, attention was paid to some flaws pointed out by Ball, Bowe and Gold. According to them,

Many studies of educational change ... have tended to reproduce two dire flaws in their conceptualisation of change .... The first of these flaws is the single change focus. That is, the often unexplained assumption that one facet of change ... can be addressed in isolation .... The second flaw is the neglect of institutional history (1992: 141).

Thus in order not to leave these flaws out consideration, the interview schedule embodies questions about the history of the school, illustrating the changes that have occurred since the inception of the school up until the emergence of the SASA.

### **Problems**

Two major problems were encountered. The first concerns the reaction of the interviewees. Ensor rightly notes that an interview is productive because "it is an invitation, an evocation, to speak". But at the same time "it is constraining insofar as it canalises and silences expression. [The reason is that] in the way it is constituted and in the manner of questioning, probing and responding, a regulation on speaking and silence is imposed, although by no means absolutely" (1996: 2). In view of this, "they are subject to the common problems of bias ... and poor or inaccurate articulation" (Yin, 1994: 85).

These problems were encountered in the course of this research because those interviewed reacted in different ways. The student was a bit hesitant in providing information, although he was assured on the confidentiality of the study. The principal also felt the need to report favourably on her responsibilities in order to avoid being labelled an irresponsible principal and co-ordinator of the governing body activities.

The other members of the governing body partly gave contrary statements, for example, by reporting that they had not received copies of the SASA, the PGE and the school's constitution, which the principal claimed they had. This is evidence of the workings of the micropolitics of the school because each of the interviewees is using a strategy to defend him/herself. However, once again, triangulation techniques provided a solution.

The second problem relates to the sample. It was difficult to interview as many members of the governing body as desirable. Many of the parents were deeply engrossed in their occupations, and arrangements made with the assistance of the principal to see them at home or at their work place proved futile. The chairperson, for example, was almost always out of the city and sometimes out of the country. At length, it became possible to interview one parent at her work place. One teacher and the student had to be interviewed at home over the week-end because they had tight schedules at school. In addition, although some newly elected members were available, they could not be utilised because they had had no training, had not attended a single meeting of the governing body, and had not read the SASA and the PGE. Apparently, they knew nothing about the GB.

### **Observation**

It would have been more useful to engage in participant observation (in which, as explained by Bless and Higson-Smith (1995: 105-106), observers may conceal the real purpose of their presence by joining the community or group under investigation as one of its members, sharing in all of its activities in order to *inter alia* enjoy the confidence of the participants and share their experiences without disturbing their behaviour and thus gain a deeper understanding of the research problem (not forgetting the risk of loss of the researcher's objectivity), but in view of Education Department's new policy on teacher retrenchment and general staffing position of schools, my presence in the school could have created a sort of discontent that could have marred the research. Therefore a simple/direct/non-participant observation (in which a researcher records events that he/she observes as an outsider, albeit there is the possibility of the subjects feeling that they are being observed and changing their behaviour) was used.

The school buildings, grounds, materials and equipment, as well as punctuality of both teachers and students, were observed and the results of this observation compared with the responses given by interviewees to questions about the functions of the GB.

### **Problems**

Postponements upon postponements of the first governing body meetings for 1998 prevented the gathering of information through observation at a governing body meeting, where competing versions of interests, values, status and power could have been revealed. Nevertheless, enough observations were made about punctuality of teachers and students and the general condition of the school to get a relatively clear understanding of key issues.

Thus even though problems and limitations were encountered in the methods used, a considerable amount of efforts have been made to make the report as accurate as possible by resorting to *inter alia* the use of triangulation.

### **4.3 Ethical Considerations**

The research necessarily involved revealing the interplay of the member categories who represented the various participants of the school. Inevitably, interviewees' feelings were going to be depicted, resulting in their risk of exposure, embarrassment, and a possible loss of standing, or self-esteem (cf. Stake, 1994; in Denzin and Lincoln (Eds.) Hence, it was necessary to pay sufficient attention to ethical connotations of research.

In this regard, at the beginning of the contact with the school, the purpose of the research was explained to the principal and the members of the GB who were available. Each respondent's permission was sought for the interview and everyone assured of the confidentiality of the data: that the name of their school would be kept anonymous, no respondent's name would be mentioned, and criticisms would be generalised.

The following chapter presents an analysis of the results of the investigation. The analysis begins with the history of the field of study in order to provide a platform for assessing the successes and failures in the implementation of the SASA and, for that matter, for testing the assumptions underpinning this study.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **THE APPLICATION OF THE SASA AT WESLEY GRAMMAR SCHOOL**

#### **5.1 Background**

It was noted in the preceding chapters that micropolitics exists in schools because even though there may be co-operation between the participants (the principals, teachers, students and parents), there is usually rivalry for power, status, personal values and survival among them. The sources of this rivalry were traced to the schools' structural looseness; the schools' dependence on their environments; and the presence of 'dissensus' and goal diversity as well as the existence of bureaucracy in the schools (see Chapter 1). For this reason an investigation into the micropolitics of the SASA was made to ascertain how the micropolitics of the school's life impacts on the SASA. The data collected for the investigation are analysed in this chapter. The analysis begins with the history of the school.

#### **5.2 History of the School**

According to the principal, Wesley Grammar was established as a Department of Education and Training (DET) school in 1990 in a black township, from where it drew most of its students, and the rest from townships nearby. It was quite disadvantaged because besides the discrimination it suffered from the Education Department in terms of distribution of human and material resources, as was the case with such schools in the apartheid era (cf., Chapter 2) it had no classrooms. Its students shared the premises with Adeebie Commercial School (a false name) in the same township on a five hour daily shift. This continued until 1992 when some members of the community in the township, students and teachers of the school, marched into a suburb of the city and seized an abandoned building that had been used for the education of children with special education needs. The manner of acquisition by black people of the abandoned building in a white area at a time when apartheid government had not died out is significant because it illustrates the fact that micropolitics is not only about conflicts in

organisations; it is also “about co-operation and how people build support among themselves to achieve their ends” (Blase, 1991; in Blase and Anderson, 1995: 3).

The principal indicated that by this time (1992), and before the implementation of the SASA, the school was professionally managed by the “controlling body” of the school, comprising the principal, the deputy and the departmental heads of the school. In terms of governance, however, the school was managed, from 1990, by the Parent-Teacher-Student Association (PTSA) of the school which consisted of 8 parents, 5 students and 5 teachers (including the principal). Parents and teachers were elected at a meeting of parents and teachers respectively, and students from each standard elected a representative.

According to the principal, the PTSA operated within a written constitution drawn up by the members, using a prescribed guideline from the DET. Members underwent no training; one of the teachers interviewed revealed that they were given a PTSA document by the Education Department to study when she was elected to be a member of the PTSA in 1994 and told to wait for a trainer, but this trainer never turned up. This lack of training may have contributed to a lack of requisite skills and knowledge necessary to fulfil their PTSA functions competently as, according to the Hunter Commission Report (1995: 27), happened in many of the schools before the SASA.

The principal indicated that the PTSA performed functions approximate to those stipulated by the SASA. These included recommendation for appointment of teachers, maintenance and improvement of the school property and buildings, determination of school fees, establishment and control of school fund and preparation of the school's annual budgets. No remuneration was paid, albeit reimbursements were made for fares and incidental expenses incurred in connection with PTSA activities.

Besides the PTSA, there were 2 sub committees: a fund raising committee which comprised 2 teachers, 2 parents and 2 students, and a disciplinary committee which consisted of 5 teachers and the head of the SRC. The fund raising committee assisted the PTSA to raise funds for the maintenance of the school buildings, sporting activities,



settlement of telephone bills, school dance, organising transport to the beach and purchasing learning and teaching materials. The disciplinary committee operated independently of the PTSA and tackled issues concerning the wearing of school uniform, lateness, impertinence and suspension of students as well as corporal punishment.

The admission of students was carried out by the principal and the teaching staff on a first come, first served basis. Documentary evidence about student enrolment and changes in student numbers shows that student enrolment, before the implementation of the SASA in 1997, totalled 1120 in 1993; 856 in 1994; 842 in 1995; and 841 in 1996. Records from 1990-92 were not available, hence it was difficult to make a thorough analysis of the changes in numbers. However, the drop in total population from 1120 in 1993 to 856 in 1994 is attributed by the principal largely to the long distance from the school to the students' home in the townships. According to the principal, arrangements made with the PTSA to bus students to and from the school failed because many parents could not pay the fare, and as getting transport from the townships early in the morning was difficult, many of the students found it preferable to transfer to schools nearby their homes in the townships. Other reasons accounting for the changes in student numbers such as drop-out and poor results are examined in the analysis below. It is unclear though how this affected the micropolitics of the school except to note that the school's response was to organise extra-classes and to begin to develop closer co-operation.

In terms of students' performance, available records of the school show that before 1996 it was unsatisfactory, though it improved steadily from 1994, as reflected in the matriculation examination pass rates which rose from 33% in 1994 to 71% in 1997. There are no figures for matriculation results from 1990-1993 because the first batch of students took the examination in 1994. The improvement in the results is attributed by the principal and teachers to co-operation between teachers and students, discipline, punctuality and regularity of both teachers and students, and development support from parents. Other contributory factors such as merit selection, drop-out and a high repetition rate have also been mentioned under the analysis.

In respect of staff appointment and numbers, the principal stated that all of them were appointed by the ex-DET on the recommendation of the PTSA. Records about staff numbers as tabulated in Table 3 below show that the number of teachers remained constant from 1994 to 1996 at 32. It then increased to 33 in 1997 and decreased to 27 in 1998 as student numbers changed. All teachers were qualified and this may have contributed to the good matriculation results. Figures for non-educating staff have also remained constant throughout the years: one secretary (for administration), one caretaker and one night watchman.

**Table 3: Staff numbers (1994-98).**

Year	*1990-92	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Teachers		32	32	32	33	27
Admin.		1	1	1	1	1
Others		2	2	2	2	2
Total		35	35	35	36	30

\* No records available

The extra-mural curriculum of the school included sports - cricket, netball, soccer and rugby - (the sports facilities were shared with a nearby school because Wesley Grammar did not have its own) - a drama group and a school choir. The principal and teachers have been determining the extra-mural curriculum for the school since its inception<sup>1</sup>.

With regard to funding, the principal pointed out that there was a school fee of R20 before she took over the principalship of the school in 1994. Every student, irrespective of his/her (parents') financial position paid the fee. This fee went into the school fund for which a bank account was opened. This fund was used for the purposes indicated above, and controlled by a "Controlling Staff" made up of the principal, the deputy and the subject heads. The Controlling Staff also drew up the school's annual budgets for examination and approval by the fund raising committee. It was necessary to study

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<sup>1</sup> This is dealt with more fully under comments on 'determination of extra-mural curriculum'.

some of the previous budgets of the school so as to track the changes in its governance and funding. However, when a request for some of the budgets was made they were not produced. It appears the school did not have any budgets before the introduction of the SASA, or for confidential purposes the principal did not want to release them. If no budgets were drawn up, then this was a mark of maladministration at that time.

Such was the governance and funding of the school before the emergence of the SASA in November 1996. The following analysis concerns the governance and funding system of the school subsequent to the emergence and implementation of the SASA.

### **5.3 The Analysis**

This section will deal with the key aspects of the SASA discussed in Chapter 3, namely:

- the establishment of the GB;
- the presentation and understanding of the SASA and the PGE;
- the adoption of a constitution by the GB;
- the membership, office bearers and voting rights of the GB
- meetings of the GB;
- remuneration and reimbursement;
- committees of the GB; *and*
- functions of the GB.

#### **5.3.1 Establishment of the GB**

The SASA was implemented at the school in 1997. In that year, the GB was established to replace the management committee of the school. An interview with the principal about the procedure and date for the establishment of the GB revealed that criteria for determining the quorum for the election and the composition of the members, as well as the dates for the election, were set by the Education Department. For the election, they were assisted by an NGO officer. This does not contravene the law, for as stipulated in the SASA (section 28) and the provision under “delegation of powers”, (SASA, section 62), conditions for the election of the GB members must be determined by the MEC in the Provincial Gazette and the MEC may,

subject to such conditions as he or she may determine, delegate any power conferred upon him or her by or under this Act [i.e. the SASA] to the Head of Department or an officer, except the power to publish a notice and the power to decide an appeal lodged with him or her in terms of this Act. The Head of Department may, subject to such conditions as he or she may determine, delegate to an officer any of his or her powers in terms of this Act ....

[SASA: section 62, subsections (1) and (2)].

Hence, following the criteria set by the Education Department and the guidelines given by the NGO officer, it was agreed that 10% of either parent (i.e. the mothers or the fathers of the students) were to be present to form a quorum for the election.

The composition of the GB members was set at 8 parents, 2 teachers, 2 students and the principal. Based on the student population of 935, at least, 93 of either parents were to be present before the election could take place. The principal sent prior notice to parents through the students about the day for the election. The election took place in September, although the principal could not remember the exact date. On that day more than 93 parents assembled at the school and 8 parents were elected with the assistance of a principal (from another school as an electoral officer) and 3 teachers of the school, together with a few students (who were present to ensure that there was free and fair election by cross-checking parents' identification with available records like the school register). In the case of the election of the teachers, they were all present to nominate and elect 2 representatives. The students also got their representation of 2 from the members of the SRC through an SRC assemblage.

The current composition of the GB members changes the composition of the ex-PTSA, which comprised 5 teachers (including the principal), 5 students, and the same number of parents (8) on the PTSA. As noted in Chapter 2 of this work, the SASA accentuates the consensus of its preceding texts about the fact that since "parents have the most at stake in the education of their children" (WP2b: section 3.15, p.18), they should form the majority on the GB (Hunter Commission Report: paragraph 6.29, p.55; WP2a: section 4.12(2) p.20; WP2b: section 3.15, pp.16 & 18). Hence, this change is the result

of the significance that the SASA and its preceding texts attach to a parental majority on the GB.

According to the principal, about half of the parents on the GB are well educated and some hold high positions. For example the chairperson is an executive member of an NGO. This provides an advantage to the school since the GB members, being well educated, might be in a better position to make positive contributions to the school with their knowledge and experience.

### **5.3.2 Presentation and Understanding of The SASA and The Provincial Gazette Extraordinary (PGE).**

Respondents were asked to explain how they came to understand the SASA and the PGE in order to ascertain their knowledge about it and their role in the governance and funding of the school. The principal indicated that there was a one day workshop for principals for this purpose, organised by a Non-Governmental Organisation, employed by the Education Department, on 16 April 1997, from 6pm-11pm. The parent member mentioned that the principal read and interpreted the documents to her because she could not attend a workshop organised for parents on the GB. The teachers stated that they had no idea about both documents because they had not got copies. According to the student, the documents were interpreted to them at a workshop organised for students on the GB on one week-end (Friday and Saturday) by a "University of Cape Town student liaison" (in the words of the student) some time in 1997.

Again, respondents were asked to indicate if at all they have copies of the SASA and the PGE. Whereas the principal claimed to have had copies of the SASA and the PGE and given each GB member a copy of each, the members interviewed claimed not to have received them. When asked why, the parent member indicated that "only the chair lady can have it". In other words they believe they are not entitled to it. The teachers said they were arranging to get copies. According to the student, they had been compelled to use the Schools Bill because both documents had not been made available to them.

The responses other than that of the principal indicate that copies of the SASA and PGE have not been made available to the members. This may be true or false. If it is true, then this lack of responsibility may be attributed to the kind of power being used by the principal. According to Blase and Anderson there are three types of power in terms of relationships in organisations. These are *power over*, *power through*, and *power with* (1995: 13). *Power over* approach refers to the type of power employed *over* followers by a leader who is strongly influenced by bureaucratic traditions and therefore tries to achieve goals through his control of resources, persuasiveness, and hierarchical position over the followers. *Power through* approach alludes to the type of power *through* followers by a leader strongly influenced by the human relations and organisational development traditions and in which goals are achieved through the motivation and mobilisation of followers. *Power with* approach refers to the type of power used *with* followers by a leader strongly influenced by the feminist, participatory and workplace democracy tradition in which goals are achieved through the collaboration of leaders and followers (ibid: 14). A leadership that is authoritarian tends to utilise *power over* approach which is largely based on domination and control, and allows leaders to enhance their power at the expense of others. The principal may be using this type of power (*power over*) which encourages the use of control of information and information flow and this could account for the reason why members have not got copies of the SASA and the PGE. On the other hand, if the responses are false, then the respondent may have been given copies of the documents but in order to cover up their apathy and their lack of commitment to their duties, they decided to put the blame on the principal.

In terms of training as specified by the SASA, there is supposed to be enhancement of capacity of all the GB members. Yet, the interviews have revealed that the teachers have had no training at all. They claim no workshop has been organised for them even though, according to the principal, workshops have been organised for each member category. The principal's claim could be right because responses from the rest of the respondents (the principal herself, the student and the parent) indicate that they have undergone some training, which was the workshop referred to above. They even went to the extent of indicating that even though the training was very enriching, more is

required in order to update them. This suggests an indication of their preparedness to commit themselves to their responsibilities as GB members. However, if the teachers are claiming that no workshop has been organised for them, then there may be poor communication between the principal and the teachers and so the teachers are developing coping strategies by pretending that they did not know of the workshop and so could not attend. This poor communication may be the result of the micropolitics of the school; or the poor communication may be causing the micropolitics of the school. If the poor communication is the result of the micropolitics of the school, then by reason of an unfavourable relationship between the principal and the teachers, the principal may be using a leadership style that does not auger well for the successful implementation of the SASA. Leadership style, in the context of a micropolitical analysis, “refers to types of political strategies employed by leaders and the forms these strategies take” (Blase and Anderson, 1995: 15). Two types of leadership styles - *open* and *closed* - have influence on the nature of institutional micropolitics. In the open style the principal adopts “ideological forms of control” and wields power in more indirect ways (ibid). In the closed style, the principal wields power in fairly direct ways, and “micropolitical interaction with teachers are generally characterised by avoidance, defensiveness and protection” (ibid). If the principal is using this closed type of leadership style, then this may account for the responses being offered by both the teachers and the principal. Indeed, situational variations or changes over time in the school’s environment may well produce stylistic reworking, and performance of the style may be tailored for different audiences. However, as far as reforms are concerned, open-style of leadership can be very effective because it creates interpersonal relationships, the foundation upon which the work of the school rests. As noted by Ball (1993: 91) “it is ... through [good] interpersonal relationships that the task functions of headship are achieved”.

### **5.3.3 Adoption of Constitution by the GB**

One of the provisions of the SASA is for the GB to function in terms of a constitution which complies with minimum requirements set by the MEC by notice in the Provincial Gazette. However, when respondents were asked if the school had a constitution, they replied that 2 members of the GB (one teacher and a parent) were

mandated in September 1997 to draw up a constitution, but up until now (i.e. the time of this research) this has not been done. According to the principal and teachers, those who were mandated have not been able to meet because they have been very busy. When asked why the responsibility was not given to other members who were less busy, the response was that every member of the GB has been delegated a responsibility and so they were waiting for those responsible for drawing up the constitution to do so shortly. This may be an indication of lack of commitment to governing body duties of those who were mandated or all GB members. However, it could also be that the task was too heavy to be executed by two people and this may have made them feel disempowered. There could also be an element of problematic relationships in the GB itself, leading to the failure of the execution of this responsibility.

#### **5.3.4 Membership, Office Bearers and Voting Rights of the GB**

Responses that emerged from the interview with the principal, teachers and students, as to whether they are happy about the parental majority on the GB contradicted my prejudices about the negative impact of micropolitics on the composition of the GB. Surprisingly, all the respondents indicated that they are happy about the parental majority on the GB. For the principal and the parent, the learners are the children of the parents, and therefore it was felt that the school belongs to the parents. By reason of this, the parents should have a major say in the school, and it is through their numerical strength that they can do so. For the student, most teachers do not have children in the school, rather it is the parents. Hence, even though the teachers are, as he put it, “professionally qualified to take decisions and manage the affairs of the school, the parents have to constitute the majority on the decision making body”. One teacher indicated that it is the duty of the parents to remind the teachers of their responsibilities. This teacher explained that the parents’ numerical strength is necessary to create room for them to make their maximum contribution to the education of the learners because teachers do not have all the knowledge for the upbringing of the child. The other mentioned that the parents are not in the school and so by involving many of them, opportunity is created for them (the teachers) to let the parents know what is happening in the school.



It is, however, not too surprising that there is understanding and acceptance of parental majority on the GB because the original membership of the ex-PTSA also consisted of a parental majority. As noted by Hanson (1997: 304-5) if innovations provide for “functional equivalents” of critical features found in the ‘old ways of doing things’ intense resistance to such innovations is likely to be avoided.

In any case, the respondents’ answers confirm Munn’s statement that “parental involvement in schools is now generally recognised” (1993: 1). The SASA has refined the rights of all parents by making them customers (giving them the right to choose the school their children will attend) and managers (to take part in school management in order to render schools more responsive to parental concerns for the achievement of school effectiveness and improvement). It was expected that the principal and teachers would react unfavourably to the numerical strength of parents on the governing body. However, this did not happen. Instead the respondents, through their responses, have demonstrated their realisation of the advantages of school-parent partnership in terms of school improvement.

### **5.3.5 Meetings of the GB**

The SASA requires the GB to meet at least once every school term. However the body, according to the principal, met for the first time on 17 September and the second time on 19 October 1997 because election of members was held late in 1997 due to delays from the education department about guidelines for the elections. To enable other participants of the school who are not members of the GB to become aware of the procedure for holding meetings, the principal summoned them for a meeting and the procedures were communicated to them. Issues which were dealt with at the meetings were the construction of two classrooms and a library (which was completed early this year) and the drawing up of a new constitution. Since then the governing body has not met again. There have been postponements upon postponements of meetings. When asked why, all the respondents claimed that the chairperson and the deputy are usually not in Cape Town and are so busy that they were not able to meet. Reasons why

meetings could not be held without them was sought. The response was “they are the only persons who can call a meeting”.

It is apparent from the respondents’ statement that they are either ignorant of their responsibilities or are just being apathetic or shirking their responsibilities. As indicated in Chapter 3, section 22 of the PGE states that in the absence of the chairperson from a meeting of the GB, the members who form a quorum (one more than half of the total number) must elect any person from their number to preside at that meeting, and that any decisions taken at the meeting shall be binding upon all. Yet the principal and the other GB members could not meet just because of the absence of the chairperson and the deputy. Obviously, neither the letter nor the spirit of the SASA (or the PGE) is being applied the way it should in this school. In this case, then, it is not only micropolitics, viz, the kind of power or leadership style of the principal which is impeding the successful execution of the objectives of the SASA; one of a combination of weak administration, ignorance, shirking of responsibilities and low level of professionalism (in terms of attitudes towards extra-mural curricula activities) among the educating staff could also be acting as an impediment. If it is the shirking of responsibilities and the low level of professionalism of the teachers in terms of their attitude to extra-mural activities, then, it may of course be a form of power/political resistance to the characteristics of the power and leadership style of the school, as explained above (cf. pp.65-7).

In addition, requests for documentary proof of the minutes and agenda for the previous meetings held were made but even though the principal claims copies have been kept, they could not be produced. The principal kept on promising to show them to me, but at length, I was told they are written in the vernacular language and so I would not understand even if I looked at them. In order not to mar, but to maintain, the rapport established and, thus, obtain the rest of the relevant data required for the investigation, it was found advisable to cease making repetitive requests about the proof and acquiesce to the excuse. In any case, if there are no records for the minutes and agenda, then this also gives an indication of a lack of responsibility of the GB and a weak

administration of the school. On the other hand, the records may have been available, but probably for confidential reasons they were not given out.

### **5.3.6 Remuneration and Reimbursement**

The question concerning remuneration was posed to find out the extent to which members expressed intrinsic and/or extrinsic motivation to be members of the GB. Whereas some members want to be remunerated and reimbursed, others want only reimbursement. The parent member who wants to be remunerated commented, “who doesn’t like money?” and suggested that the government should pay about R60 to each member for every meeting they attend. One teacher also suggested a “token amount” but could not be specific. These respondents’ reason is that the work of the GB is demanding. When asked whether they have complained for not being remunerated, they explained that the other members might not consent to it. However, they both claimed that in spite of the absence of remuneration, they are happy and willing to discharge their duties in the interest of the school.

The rest of the interviewees who are not interested in remuneration intimated that the work demands those who are ready to sacrifice; such people are willing to work and commit themselves to the welfare of the school. For example, one teacher added that if there was remuneration, every person would wish to be a member, just to get remunerated although he/she might not be committed.

The different feelings expressed by the respondents are significant for they suggest that not all the parents realise the importance of their direct involvement in their children’s schooling without expectation of remuneration.

### **5.3.7 Committees of the GB**

The committees of the GB are the fund raising committee which comprises 2 teachers, 2 parents and 2 students, and a disciplinary committee which consists of 5 teachers and the head of the SRC. The fund raising committee assists the PTSA to raise funds for expenses like the maintenance of the school buildings, sporting activities and settlement of telephone bills. The disciplinary committee operates independently of the PTSA and tackles issues concerning things like lateness and punishment. According to the

principal, no new committees have been formed and members of the old committees of the PTSA have continued to be on the current committees through re-election. This does not contravene the SASA because there is no provision for the changes in the membership or office bearers of the committees in the document.

### **5.3.8 Functions of the Governing Body**

#### ***5.3.8.1 Admission of Students***

The interview with the principal revealed that there has been no change in the admission procedure used before the implementation of the SASA. Like the ex-PTSA, the GB admits students on a first come, first served basis, with consideration for the number that the school can contain. The reason offered by the principal is that students come from disadvantaged backgrounds and so they cannot discriminate against them. However, students who apply to transfer to the school need to submit previous academic reports and transfer letters from their former schools as prerequisite for admission to enable the school to ascertain the credibility of the applicants' claims.

In order to find out whether there was any kind of discrimination, the principal and the teachers were asked whether it was beneficial for them to admit students who had failed totally in one school and wanted to transfer into another. The response was that when vacancies were limited, they based their admissions "on merit" (i.e. they selected).

The admission of students "on merit" when vacancies are few is contrary to the SASA stipulation about unfair discrimination in the admission of learners to public schools (SASA, section 5(1), p.6). This could partly account for the tremendous improvement of the school in the matriculation examination results. Available records of the school show that the general performance of the students before 1996 was unsatisfactory but that this improved steadily, as reflected in the matriculation examination pass rates shown in Table 4 below, from 33% in 1994 to 71% in 1997. The Table shows no figures for matriculation results from 1990-93 because the first batch of students took the examination in 1994. Also, in view of the problem of acquisition of requisite records, data for the period 1990-92 is not shown on the table. Furthermore, some registers for 1994-96 were not available and those available were unreliable because

they do not provide sufficient reasons for the changes in student numbers. Explanations for the changes in student numbers are therefore based on the principal's records and verbal responses, some of which lack supporting figures. Table 4 shows the student numbers for 1993-98.

**Table 4: Number of students per class per year: 1993-1998.**

Year	1990-92*	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Class	Number of Students						
Std 6		281	209	214	161	150	193
Std 7		236	130	155	135	144	181
Std 8		288	189	178	249	244	186
Std 9		176	189	163	171	193	223
Std 10		139	139	132	125	123	152
Total		1120	856	842	841	854	935
Matric Results		*N/A	33%	35%	50%	71%	**

\* *Not applicable.*

\*\* *Next matric examination yet to be written.*

In addition to merit selection which could partly account for the improvement in the matriculation examination results, an examination of the student flows from 1993-1997 shows the impact of drop-out and repetition on results. Of the 281 pupils who began in 1993, less than half (123) matriculated in 1997. This decrease could be accounted for by the fact that some of the students transferred to other schools as the class progressed from one standard to the other. Between 1993 and 1994 (Standard 6-7), there was a decrease of 151 pupils (281-130). This may have occurred because the transport costs became too high for many. Between Standard 7 and 8 (1994-95), the numbers increased to 178 (+48) and stayed stable from Standard 8-9 (1995-96). This latter increase can partly be attributed to repetition of some of the 1994 Standard 8 class. In the matriculation year (1997) there was a considerable decline from 171 to 123 pupils of whom 71% passed the matriculation examination. Clearly, merit selection, drop-out and repetition as well as the quality of teaching, have combined to produce the

improved results. These results have, according to the principal, attracted large numbers to Standard 6 in 1998.

Respondents were asked to explain their roles in the admission of students. According to the teachers, they assist the principal by examining records of relevant documents of applicants (for example, their school reports and testimonials). The principal, acting in consultation with the teachers, decides on the number to be admitted. The parent and student members do not have a hand in the admissions. For the parent, "it is the teachers who are in the school, so they have to admit and inform the governing body of the number admitted". The student is not aware that he should be involved and feels that it is the principal and teachers who can decide on the number and the type of students to admit to each class. The fact that parents and students on the governing body are not involved in the admission of students could therefore create room for academic discrimination.

There is in addition a potential for economic discrimination as the principal and teachers intend increasing fees in 1999, although they have not reached consensus with the parents. The fact that the staff have to reach consensus with parents before increasing the fee shows the influence of group activity (i.e. the parents) on decision-making in schools. However, the investigation has revealed that the school virtually decides on major policies such as this and extra-mural activities and then inform the parents because the GB hardly meets and parents hardly come to meetings when they are invited to do so by the school. Therefore once the staff succeed in increasing the fee with the full approval of the GB, students who would be incapable of paying may be refused admission. Since the parents and students are not involved in student admissions, they might not know exactly why certain students could not be admitted and for that matter act in the interest of the students who have been refused admission on grounds of their inability to pay fees. The possibility exists therefore for discrimination in students' admission on grounds of non-payment of fees which the SASA seeks to eliminate. This is a typical example of the kind of contradiction pointed out in the analysis of the SASA: the equity-redress issue is not fully addressed because

one group (those able to pay the fee) might be favoured over the other (those incapable of paying).

On the other hand, it might happen that all the member categories (parents, students, teachers and the principal) would agree to the increase in fees. In this case, a mechanism for identifying those who may be incapable of paying would have to be put in place in order to meet the SASA's requirement for total, partial and conditional exemption from the payment of fees. This, however, remains to be seen in future practice.

#### ***5.3.8.2 Recommendation for the Appointment of Teachers***

Respondents were asked whether there had been any new appointments of teachers since the beginning of 1997. The response was that no new appointments had been made. However, 5 temporary teachers whose contract matured at the close of 1997 left, and one permanent teacher died at the beginning of 1998. Responses for the role of the GB in the appointment of teachers and why the GB got involved in this were also sought. The respondents intimated that they would want to examine the documents of applicants, talk to, and interview them, so that they can have some idea of how conscientious and co-operative they might be. These intentions are good, and if put into practice, will demonstrate the positive role that the GB plays, in terms of the SASA's policy on the appointment of teachers and the enhancement of the quality of education of the school.

The question regarding the extent to which the retrenchment of teachers has affected the school revealed that it has, to a large extent, affected the school: there is a shortage of science and mathematics teachers; teachers not specialised in these subjects have been compelled to teach them; and some teachers have been overburdened because they have to take on more than the required number of loads in order to meet Education Department's requirement that the teacher student ratio should be 1:35. If the complaints were about inadequacy of teachers, then they are not genuine because the school's teacher-student ratio for 1998, for example, when compared with the teacher-student ratio required by the Education Department shows that the school has more than

enough teachers. However, it appears the complaints were about insufficient teachers per subject, as the breakdown of teachers for the various subject per year in Table 5 on the next page shows.

In any case, according to the respondents, after repeated complaints from the principal and teachers to the Area Manager, who could not take action because he also had to submit to Education Department's requirements, and finally after the whole staff and the GB had submitted a report that embodied threats of a strike to the Premier of the Western Cape, one temporary science teacher was appointed.

More detailed information on how the staff and the GB acquired the additional teacher was not given. However, what is significant here is the strategy applied by the staff and for that matter the proactiveness of the school in getting the requisite number of teaching personnel. The strategy applied shows how power and co-operation in micropolitics can be used by groups to protect themselves and build support among themselves to achieve their ends.

Again, if genuinely, there was the need for sufficient teachers per subject, then the confusion/conflict that arose in the course of the acquisition of the required number of teachers by the school demonstrates the extent to which micropolitical conflicts can promote positive changes in organisations. This is contrary to the assumption that motivated this study: that there is the likelihood that micropolitics is impeding the success of the execution of the innovation that the SASA is establishing in schools. Hence, for Baldrige *et al*, "in a fragmented, dynamic social system, conflict is natural and not necessarily a symptom of breakdown in the academic community. In fact, conflict is a significant factor in promoting healthy organisational change" (in Bush, 1995: 76).



**Table 5: Number of Teachers Per Subject Per Year (1994-98).**

Year	1990-93*	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Subjects	Number of Teachers Per Subject					
Afrikaans		5	5	5	5	5
Biology		4	4	4	4	2
English		5	5	5	4	4
Geography		2	2	2	2	2
Gen. Science		2	2	2	2	
History		3	3	3	3	3
Mathematics		3	3	3	3	2
Physical Sc.		2	2	2	2	2
Science&Tech					2	1
Xhosa		6	6	6	6	6
Total Number of Students		856	842	841	854	935
Total Number of Teachers		32	32	32	33	27
Teacher-Pupil Ratio		1:26.8 (1:27)	1:26.3 (1:26)	1:26.3 (1:26)	1:25.9 (1:26)	1:35.3 (1:35)

\* no figures available.

### 5.3.8.3 Determination of Extra-mural Curriculum

The interviews have revealed that the extra-mural activities of the school, which included sports, singing and drama, during the era of the PTSA, have now been increased to cover extra classes in science and mathematics (organised by the University of Cape Town Active Science Project), and computer training for the students (organised at Claremont by the Herschel School). According to the principal, the organisers mentioned above initiated both classes. These organisers heard of the tremendous improvement in the school's matriculation examination results, so they decided to motivate the students by providing this assistance. However, the problem the school faces, according to my observation and the interviews, is that the school

lacks facilities for sports and so it resorts to borrowing and using those nearby the school. Also, there are only a few computers and this is why the students have to travel to Claremont for computer training. The GB, according to the respondents, has appealed for donations for more computers and sports equipment which are expected to be available in 1998.

One significant thing that emerged from the interview concerning the extra-mural curriculum of the school is that, the GB does not exercise influence on this; it has been left for the school (the principal, teachers and students) to control because according to the parent member, the school staff will be able to take better decisions about this. If this parent is not exonerating the parent members of the GB for shirking their responsibilities, then this gives a favourable picture of the role of the GB of the school. The reason is that although in terms of the allocated functions, it is the whole GB that has to determine the extra-mural activities of the school, the fact that the parents see the need to delegate this responsibility to the school shows that the GB is, here, not merely applying the letter of the SASA but the spirit of it. The recognition for the need to delegate such responsibility corresponds to the fact that “when those closest to where decisions are implemented are empowered to make decisions and given ownership of the results, better decisions will be made” (Mankoe and Maynes, 1994: 23). On the other hand, if the reason for delegating the responsibility about the determination of extra-mural curriculum of the school is due to the shirking of responsibilities by the parents, then this shows that the SASA is not being applied by the GB of this school the way it should be. It may also be that the micropolitics of the school prevents the parents from getting involved in the determination of the extra-mural curriculum. As explained earlier, this may be due to the kind of power and leadership style of the principal, although this avenue could not be explored due to time constraints.

#### ***5.3.8.4 Administration and Control of the School's Property***

As part of its functions the GB, as noted in Chapter 2 of this work, is expected to administer and control the school's property, buildings and grounds. Yet, an observation made about the conditions of the school, using the observation schedule in

the appendix, brings to notice that the GB is not executing its functions satisfactorily as expected. This may be due to lack of proper supervision or follow-through. There is a labourer in charge of cleaning the school but the students' toilets are not kept clean and not even in working condition. Also, a few signs of vandalism, for example, broken windows and graffiti, are evident on the school building.

When asked whether students help to clean the school, the principal explained that they do virtually nothing to help keep the school clean because of the long distances they cover from the township to the school, which makes it difficult for them to get to school early enough to do any cleaning before classes begin or do the cleaning before returning home.

However, the school is securely fenced with a 24 hour security guard employed and paid by the Education Department. This, according to the principal, was initiated by the GB in order to curb rampant burglary at the school. The grounds are also well kept with a designated safe parking area for staff and visitors who enjoy the use of toilets kept clean and in working condition by a caretaker also employed and paid by the Education Department. Moreover, additional classrooms have been constructed to accommodate more students and avoid congestion. A library has also been opened and the GB is arranging for donations for library books.

#### ***5.3.8.5 Funding of Schools***

##### ***i) Fees***

As mentioned earlier, the interview has revealed that the principal and the teachers take decisions on major issues and inform the parents because the GB hardly meets and parents do not attend meetings. In other words the decision-making powers have remained with the school staff and not the GB. The principal and teachers have decided to increase the amount in 1999 because all other schools are paying more than that. Moreover, according to the principal and teachers, the R20 is too meagre for the school's expenditure on things like the maintenance and improvement of the school's property and buildings, sporting activities and settlement of the school's telephone bills. The parent and student, on the other hand, are happy with the R20 (without

exemption) because of the extent of poverty of some parents who, for that reason, cannot afford anything more than that.

When asked why there are no exemptions for the fee payment, all the respondents stated that the amount is so little that every parent “should” (respondents’ emphasis) be able to afford it.

Further, there was the need to find out whether there would be any exemptions if the fee was increased in order to elicit responses to the procedure that would be adopted to identify and exempt those who would be incapable of paying. The teachers mentioned that once they increase the fee they will find a means of identifying and exempting those who would be incapable of paying. One teacher used a case as an example, in which teachers of the school had to go to the homes of the pupils to chat with their parents in order to ascertain their economic background before effecting the partial or conditional exemption or enforcement of payment of a fee being levied for the construction of additional classrooms at the school.

The reaction to the fee payment is significant because first, it portrays, as noted in Chapter 3 of this report, that schools are political arenas “...arenas of struggle; ... riven with actual or potential conflict between members ... and are ideologically diverse” (Ball, 1993: 19). It is also possible for conflict to develop, since students who are unwilling to pay or incapable of paying more than R20 may resist and even find a means of convincing those who genuinely see the need to agree with the teachers for an increase to join forces with them to manipulate situations for the retention of the payment of the old fee.

Secondly, as noted earlier, the SASA makes provision “for partial, total or conditional exemption of parents who are unable to pay school fees” (section 39b, p. 26). But the current payment of R20 without exemption and the inclination to increase this amount confirms Gillborn’s findings that “macro changes in education policy do not automatically translate into changes at the school level” (1994: 162).

Furthermore, this study has revealed that parents are not involved in the admission of students to the school. For this reason, once the principal and teachers succeed in implementing the increase, the inclination by the school to tactfully attract only students who can pay in order to refuse admission to those who cannot afford will be difficult to resist.

Thus if the interest of those who cannot pay has to be safeguarded, then a mechanism for identifying and exempting them partially, totally or conditionally, has to be put in place.

#### ***ii) School Fund and Annual Budgets***

According to the principal, there have been no changes about the sources of money and uses and control of the school fund that existed before the SASA. No new directions from the Head of Department of Education (HOD) have been issued in this regard. An account was opened for the school fund before the SASA and this continues to exist.

The principal claims that annual budgets are still drawn up by the "Controlling Staff" consisting of the principal and the school's departmental heads, taking into account the needs and current financial position of the school. A further claim by the principal is that the budgets are examined and approved of by the GB of the school. However, the teachers, the parent and the student have no idea about how the account was opened, how the annual budgets are drawn up and who examines and approves of them. When asked why, they indicated that they are not informed and there have been no meetings about that.

There is a gap of credibility concerning the claims of the principal and the other respondents about the drawing up, examination and approval of the budgets. It appears that no budgets are drawn up because my requests made to the principal to see copies of the prepared budgets were never met. If it is true that annual budgets are not prepared, then this gives an indication that there is maladministration, both at the office of the MEC (which is responsible for providing guidelines for drawing up the budgets and approving of them) and the school. On the other hand the principal's claims may be

true but probably for fear of scrutiny I was denied the chance to look at the records. A further probability concerning the truths of the principal's claims is that the leadership style and the nature of the power of the principal, as explained above, may be preventing the members of the GB from having knowledge of the budgets and the school's fund. This is a commentary on where the power is located in the school as well as a pointer to the improper functioning of the GB.

#### ***5.3.9 General Comments about the SASA***

General comments from the respondents about the SASA were favourable. For the parent and teachers, it has increased community and student participation in decision-making. For the principal, it has brought a great relief because the parents now know their roles and responsibilities and are giving her more assistance and co-operating with her more than before.. To the teachers, the objectives of the SASA are noble "because this time the principals and teachers cannot do what they like". Once again, there is a credibility gap over here, for the analysis has revealed that the principal and teachers are, to some extent, doing what they like.

On the question of the participation-representation debate, all the respondents indicated that the SASA extends the logic of participation to the fullest because according to them they are enjoying a kind of participation which they never dreamt of during the apartheid era. Considering the analysis in Chapter 3, which shows that in reality the GB members enjoy little participation, this answer may be equated to the adage which goes thus: "half a loaf is better than none". In other words the GB prefers to enjoy the kind of participation they are currently entitled to rather than not enjoying any participation at all. On the other hand, it may be speculated that the respondents are not aware that the SASA has retained policy power at the central and provincial level and merely transferred implementation powers to the GB.

### **5.4 Conclusion to the Analysis**

This investigation arose from the assumption that the micropolitics of a school could hinder the successful execution of the educational reforms that the SASA seeks to achieve. The analysis of the data has revealed that the SASA has in reality, failed to

produce broad changes in the school's philosophy and practice. According to the history of the school, the ex-PTSA members underwent no training and so they may not have had the requisite skill and knowledge to perform their PTSA functions competently. This time the SASA makes provision for the enhancement of the capacity of the GB, yet the teachers on the GB of the school have not had any training even though according to the principal there was a workshop for all the GB members. Interviews with the other members of the GB have revealed that the principal's claims are right, but probably the micropolitics of the school is contributing to making the teachers apathetic towards their responsibilities as GB members. This implies that the principal may be using a kind of power or leadership style that is making the teachers develop coping strategies at the expense of the success of the SASA.

The same reason could partly be assigned to the delay in the drawing up of the school's constitution; the difficulty in the summoning of the GB for meetings; the exclusion of the parents on the GB in the determination of extra-mural curriculum; and the lack of knowledge on the part of the parents, teachers and students on the GB about issues concerning the funds and budgets of the school.

Other factors acting as hindrances to the successful implementation of the SASA include weak administration, ignorance (because of a lack of training of some of the GB members), shirking of responsibilities and low level of professionalism (in terms of non-academic responsibilities of the school) among the educating staff.

It is important to note, however, that the SASA has, to some extent, been successfully implemented in the school. In terms of the composition of the GB, the SASA requires a parental majority. Evidence that emerged from the data reveals that the school and the community understand and accept the reasons for the numerical strength of the parents. In any case, this is not too surprising because the original membership of the ex-PTSA also consisted of a parental majority (although the total number of parent members was less than the combined total of the other members). In effect therefore, there is what Hanson (1979: 304) calls "functional equivalent"; that is, there is some

elements of the 'old ways of doing things' in the SASA which is not creating resistance and this partly accounts for the partial success.

Moreover, recommendation for the appointment of teachers, which was the original function of the ex-PTSA, is being satisfactorily done by the GB. Furthermore, regarding the provision of quality education for learners of the school, the study has revealed that the GB has managed to get sufficient number of teachers for each subject through micropolitical manoeuvres.

There has also been progress in terms of the administration, maintenance and improvement of the school's property and buildings. Although the students' toilets are not in a working condition and not kept clean, and also a few signs of broken windows and graffiti are evident on the school building, the GB has managed to construct additional classrooms and created a library for which books are being arranged through solicitations for donations by the GB.

In addition, there has been some successes in terms of the funding of the school. Although the school does not allow exemptions in the payment of fees - a condition contrary to what the SASA stipulates - a R20 fee per student per year has been collected without protest for such things as maintenance of the school, purchasing of learning and teaching materials and settlement of the school's telephone bills. Once again, this was something in existence at the time of the ex-PTSA and so it is not surprising that it is functioning satisfactorily.

However, there is the tendency for micropolitical processes of the school to mar the success of the funding system. The research has revealed that at the moment, the teachers and the principal want to increase the fees because the R20 is too low to meet the expenditure of the school. The problem here is that there is the influence of group activity within the GB because the teachers and principal have to succeed in convincing the rest of the GB about the increase. This existence of the influence of group activity can impede the implementation of the school's policy on the fee. The reason is that groups have divergent goal aspirations and conflicting claims on decision makers which



provide a setting for political behaviour as the groups pursue their independent objectives. Consequently, even though the teachers and the principal see the need to increase the school fee, they cannot do so without receiving the full approval of the GB and the parents through bargaining and negotiation, because the GB has to agree to the extra amount to be charged, taking into consideration the poor background of some of the learners. There is also the factor of co-operative and conflicting actions on the students' reaction; the GB may increase the fee, but the majority of the students have to agree, otherwise there will be boycotting of classes and demonstrations.

In a nutshell, then, the micropolitics of the school has, to some extent, impeded the success of the SASA. However, at the same time it has contributed to its success. If the reforms of the SASA are to be executed successfully in this school, then there is the need for the principal to use appropriate power and leadership style and develop and facilitate collaborative groups with the staff and members of the GB.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

This study has noted and expounded the existence of micropolitics in schools and how it can operate to inhibit reforms. The main elements of micropolitics were noted, namely, strategic use of power, co-operation, interests and conflict. It was indicated that in addition to the co-operation between the participants (principals, teachers, students and parents) of the school required for daily functioning, there is usually struggle for power, status, personal values and survival amongst them. This struggle arises as a result of the schools' structural looseness; the schools' dependence on their environments; the existence of bureaucracy in schools; and the lack of consensus and goal diversity in schools. As a result of this struggle, educational reforms, which usually involve redistribution of lines of information flow, could undermine or enhance vested interests, resulting in factional groups or individuals seeking to advance or defend their interests by being for or against the change, either through clandestine manoeuvres or lobbying.

Considering the above, it was felt that there could be hindrances in the implementation of the SASA, which contains tensions and contradictions. The SASA, as mentioned in Chapter 1, emerged from the need to address problems associated with the pattern of school organisation, governance and funding; administrative problems; weaknesses of the governance structures; restricted access to schools; and inequity in the provision of educational resources; and thereby provide high quality education for all learners. In order to ensure that basic principles such as democracy, equality and equity are upheld, the SASA is embedded in discourses such as decentralisation and participation.

However, an analysis of the SASA has revealed some tensions and contradictions: devolved powers are in conflict with 'original' decision-making powers; the fulcrum of power has been situated and so regulated participation is in tension with a populist notion of democracy; equity and redress pull at each other because equality, not equity is favoured at the national level.

These tensions and contradictions, together with the reality of the existence of micropolitics in schools, as well as the fact that “macro changes in education policy do not automatically translate into changes at the school level” (Gillborn, 1994: 162), stimulated an investigation into the micropolitics of schools’ life on the SASA.

The investigation took the form of a case study at Wesley Grammar School, from where the data was gathered through the use of available documentation, interviews and observation. Problems were encountered in gathering the data. Among them is the choice of simple observation under constraint. As pointed out under ‘research methodology and methods’ in Chapter 3, the study of organisational micropolitics usually requires participant observation over a sufficient period of time, depending on the organisation’s environment, in order to appreciate the harmonious and/or conflictual relations that pattern the organisation’s life. Unfortunately, because of tensions in the school deriving from teacher retrenchment and staffing problems, simple observation was resorted to. Nonetheless, for all the instruments used, every effort was made to secure a considerable amount of relevant data so as to make the results of the investigation as reliable as possible.

In the final analysis, the results have revealed that the SASA has, in reality, failed to produce broad changes in the school’s philosophy and practice:

- the GB has delayed in drawing up the school’s constitution;
- it has not been meeting as regularly as the SASA requires because there is difficulty in summoning the members;
- there is the exclusion of the parent members on the GB in the determination of the extra-mural curriculum;
- the teachers on the GB are not aware of their full responsibilities because they lack training;
- the parents, teachers and students on the GB are ignorant about how the school’s budgets are drawn up and how the funds are used.

Even though the micropolitics of the school could not be fully captured (in view of the simple observation technique used in gathering the data), an analysis of the verbal

responses of the interviewees has revealed some elements of micropolitics of the school that may be contributing to the failure of the SASA. This implies that the principal may be using a kind of power or leadership style that makes the teachers in particular and the GB in general develop coping strategies at the expense of the success of the SASA. The reference to the responses about the enhancement of the capacity of the GB and the presentation and understanding of the SASA and the PGE, of which the respondents denied the principal's allegation about giving copies to the GB members, provide clear examples.

Other contributory factors which have impeded the success of the SASA are poor communication, weak administration and the teachers' low level of professionalism (in terms of non-academic responsibilities of the school), which have caused the delay in the drawing up of the school's constitution, the non-attendance of training meant for enhancing the capacity of the GB members, and the lack of knowledge of the school budgets and the use of the school funds.

However, there have been successful aspects in the implementation of the SASA. For example, the numerical strength of the parents on the governing body and the issues of decentralisation and funding, have not created the resistance anticipated.

Surprisingly, the parental majority on the GB has been accepted with the understanding that school-parent partnership enhances school effectiveness and facilitates school improvement. This was despite teachers previously being in the majority on the PTSA.

In terms of decentralisation, even though the SASA does not extend the logic of participation to the fullest, the GB members accept their role as policy implementors who do not have 'original' powers (although they can take and implement decisions over 'minor issues' without consulting a higher authority). The reason for their acceptance, as put forward by the respondents, is that they are now enjoying a kind of participation in decision-making which they never dreamt of during the apartheid era. This is exemplified by the ways in which the GB has approached its role in the enhancement of the quality of education: the school has managed to secure a library

and the acquisition of a well-equipped science laboratory is on the way; students are engaged in extra-mural curricula activities such as extra science and mathematics classes as well as computer training; and the school has launched appeal for donations for more computers and sport equipment. These activities have contributed to the improvement in the matriculation examination results of the school.

In respect of the funding issue, as indicated, the SASA encourages the schools to supplement state resources. The school has been raising money to supplement state funding of schools by collecting a R20 fee per student per year for expenses like maintenance of the school buildings, purchasing of learning materials and settlement of the school's telephone bills. Even though the payment is without exemption in contradiction the exemption clauses of the SASA, the agreement of the pupils to this may have to do with the low amount (R20). However, this acceptance may be tested with the anticipated increase in fees.

In a nutshell, then, even though the SASA has not made broad changes in the school's philosophy and practice, it has registered some successes in the school. In both cases - failures and successes - micropolitics is a contributory factor.

It is hoped that through the development of appropriate power and leadership styles as well as the facilitation of collaborative groups with the school staff and members of the GB, the SASA reforms could be implemented more successfully.

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## APPENDIX

### INTERVIEW WITH THE PRINCIPAL

#### BACKGROUND

##### Some Questions About the Establishment of the School.

1. When was the school founded?.....
2. Which standards did you begin with?.....
3. Roughly how many classes and students per class per year have you had since that year?      **\*\* N.B. Ask for records about the numbers.**

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Class	Number of Students								
Std 6									
Std 7									
Std 8									
Std 9									
Std 10									
Totals									

Explain the changes in student numbers:

4. When the school began, where were most of the students drawn from?

- 1) Khayelitsha
- 2) Khayelitsha and townships near-by
- 3) Other (specify)

5. At present from where do you get most of the students?

- 1) the townships    2) in and around Mowbray    3) other

6. (If from the townships) are they bussed, and if so who pays?

Bussed?

- 1) yes
- 2) no

Who Pays?

- 1) students themselves
- 2) Education Department
- 3) paid from school fund
- 4) not applicable

7. Did you have sufficient staff at the beginning of the school?

- 1) yes
- 2) no

Comments: Probe for numbers and reasons for changes in numbers.

**\*Number of Teachers and Other Staff**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Teachers									
Admin									
Others									
Total									

**\*Permanent and Temporary**

Probe for qualifications and subject specialisation

Reasons for changes in numbers.....

#### Academic Results and Ethos of the School

8. \*\*What was the general performance of students like during the early stages of the school?

- 1) very good    2) good    3) average    4) poor

Explain.....

**\*\*NB: Ask for records.**

9. How about matric results? Code as above.

Explain.....

☐

10. The extract of your interview shows that the current matric results are good. How were you able to obtain such remarkable results?

Comments: Probe for response, using the table below.

<u>Management</u>	Yes	No	Explain
special promotion policy?	....	....	.....
homework?	....	....	.....
discipline (e.g. lateness)?	....	....	.....
<u>Adequate Materials</u>			
textbooks?	....	....	.....
other (specify)	....	....	.....
<u>Teachers</u>			
quality?	....	....	.....
<u>Devpt. Support</u>			
parents & community;	....	....	.....
other (specify)	....	....	.....

Extra-mural Activities

11. Do you have special extra-mural activities?

1) yes

2) no

12. What kind?

Tick

☒

sports  
clubs  
extra classes  
other (specify)

Comments: Probe for types and reasons for types chosen.

Sports

Types.....

Reason for choice.....

Clubs

Types.....

Reason for choice.....

Extra classes

Types.....

Reason for choice.....

Others

Specify.....

Reason for choice.....

The School's Position & Condition

13. The school is quite close to the streets. Do you have external disruptions?

1) very often      2) often      3) sometimes      4) rarely      5) never

14. If you do, how do you cope with that?.....

15. The school is well fenced; but do you have a 24 hour security guard also?

1) yes      2) no

If yes, who pays him?.....

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐  
☐☐☐

16. Do you experience any theft in the school, and if you do how are you controlling that? 1) yes 2) no 3) sometimes  
Control.....

17. How do you keep the school grounds and toilets clean?  
Grounds.....  
Toilets.....

*Comments: If labourers, probe for reason and the person who pays them.*

Reason.....  
Who pays?..... the school (from school fund)  
Department of Education  
Not applicable

Author's observation schedule about the condition of the school.

STATEMENT	YES	NO
1. The sch. environm't is conducive to learning (e.g. no external disruption, noise).		
2. The school grounds are clean.		
3. The school grounds are well kept (e.g. grass been cut, no weeds).		
4. The school grounds have a garden.		
5. The school is securely fenced.		
6. A security guard is on duty.		
7. A designated safe parking area for staff is available.		
8. The school building is neat and clean.		
9. Staff toilets are in working condition and clean.		
10. Student toilets are in a working condition and clean.		
11. Signs of vandalism are evident on the school grounds and school building (broken windows/doors, graffiti).		

#### Some Questions about Governance of the School:

##### A. Establishment of the Governing Body.

18. Did the school have a management committee before the current governing body was established? 1. yes 2. no

Explain.....

*Comments: Probe for composition and functions.*

Composition: No. of parents  
No. of students  
No. of teachers  
Principal (present)?  
others (specify)

Functions:.....

19. How was it set up?.....  
20. Was there a constitution, and if so, were any departmental guidelines given for drawing it up? 1) yes 2) no

21. Was the previous management committee given any training?  
1. yes 2. no

Explain.....

22. What was the nature of the training?.....  
23. How long was the training?.....  
24. Who did the training?.....

25. What problems, if any, did you have in getting people involved in the previous management committee?.....

26. Do you have the same members of the previous management committee on the current governing body?

1. yes                      2. no                      3) some

Explain.....

27. Did you have a quorum for the election of new members?

1. yes                      2. no

*Comments: Probe for the composition of the quorum, how it was determined and who determined it.*

Composition of quorum:

No. of teachers

No. of parents

No. of students

Principal (present)?

No. of others (specify)

Determination of quorum:

Criterion.....

Determinant.....

28. How were parents informed of the election?.....

29. Did you have problems in getting parents involved in the election?

- 1) a great deal                      2) few                      3) not at all

30. Explain what the cause was, and how you resolved that?

Cause.....

Solution.....

**B. Presentation and Understanding of the SASA and PGE.**

31. Do you and the members of the governing body each have copies of the SASA and the Western Cape Provincial School Education Act (PGE)?

SASA:                      1) yes                      2) no

PGE:                      1) yes                      2) no

Comments:

Principal

Teachers

Parents

Students

Co-opted

32. If no, why not?.....

33. If yes, how did you get them?.....

34. I found the SASA quite complicated; how about you and the other members of the governing body, how were you able to comprehend it?

35. Have you and the members of the governing body had any training?

1. yes                      2. no

*Comments: Probe for nature and duration of training.*

Nature.....

Duration.....

36. Who gave the training? .....

25. Did you find him/her quite helpful? 1) Yes                      2) No

Explain.....

37. Has the training been sufficient or do you need more?

1. yes, sufficient                      2. no, more is needed

Explain.....

**C. Membership, Office Bearers and Voting Rights of Governing Body.**

According to the extract of your interview in the Cape Argus, there are 8 parents, 2 teachers, and 2 students on the governing body.

38. What is the occupation of each of the parents?.....

39. Are you happy that there is parental majority on the governing body?

1. yes                      2. no

Explain.....

40. If no, which members of the governing body would you have preferred to be in the majority and why?

Members:                      1. teachers  
   2. non-educators of the school  
   3. students  
   4. other (specify)

Reason.....

41. Do you have the same *office-bearers* of the ex-management committee on the governing body or have there been changes?

1. the same                      2. changed

Explain.....

42. Are there any co-opted members on the governing body?

1. yes                      2. no

43. Who are they?.....

Why did you co-opt?.....

44. Are you happy that co-opted members do not have voting rights on the governing body?

1. yes                      2. no

Explain.....

45. If not, how have you reacted to this, and what has been the result?

Reaction.....

Result.....

**D. Some Questions About the Functions of the Governing Body.**

**Students' Admissions Policy and/or Procedure.**

46. What has been the admission procedure before and after 1997?

1) tests  
2) interviews  
3) acceptance of applications  
4) acceptance of applications and tests  
5) acceptance of applications and interviews  
6) first come, first served basis  
7) other

Before

After

**Further comments:** Probe for reason behind admission procedure adopted.

Reason.....

47. What kind of problems, if any, do you have in admitting/getting students and how have you resolved them?

Problem.....

Solution.....

**E. Appointment of Teachers.**

48. How were teachers appointed before 1997?.....



49. Did anyone make recommendations regarding the appointment of teachers? 1) yes 2) no

Who was that?.....

Comments: Probe for reasons behind the necessity for the recommendations and the problems arising thereof.

Reason.....

Problems.....

50. Have you employed new teachers since January 1997?

1) yes 2) no

Comments: Probe for numbers.

Teachers	Qualified	Underqualified	Total
Temporary			
Permanent			
Total			

NB: Probe for reason if there are still temporary and underqualified teachers.....

51. At the moment what problems does the school encounter in securing qualified teachers with subject specialisation and what is the cause?

Problems.....

Cause.....

52. Is the governing body involved in the employment of teachers?

1) yes 2) no

If no, why?.....

If yes, how does it do that?.....

53. Why is its involvement necessary?.....

54. Has its involvement created any problems, and if so how were the problems resolved? 1) yes 2) no

Solution.....

55. To what extent, and in what way, has the retrenchment of teachers affected your school, and what action have you taken?

Extent.....

Manner.....

Action taken.....

#### F. Determination of Extra-mural Curriculum.

56. Has the SASA influenced the extra-mural activities you offer?

1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

57. What role has the governing body played in getting the activities going?.....

#### G. Maintenance and Improvement of Property and Buildings.

58. What role does the governing body play in maintaining and improving the school's buildings, grounds and other property?.....

59. How about the parents?.....

60. What problems are encountered in this regard?.....

**Constitution of the Governing body.**

61. We spoke of the previous constitution of the ex-management committee.

62. How different was that from the SASA and/or PGE?.....

63. Did you use the department's guidelines and how did you change them if at all? 1) yes 2) no

Change.....

64. If there is a new one, within which framework was it drawn up?.....

65. Do members of the governing body, the HOD and other participants of the school have copies of the constitution?

1) yes

2) no

Governing Body

HOD

Other Participants

Comments: If not, probe for reason.....

Ask for a copy of the constitution.

**Meetings of the Governing Body.**

66. Has the governing body got scheduled meetings?

1. yes

2. no

Comments: Probe for the schedule.....

67. How often does it meet?.....

68. What problems does it encounter in summoning the members, and how are you solving that?.....

Solution.....

69. What are the major issues that the governing body/school has to deal with?

70. Which issues become controversial, and why?

1) Controversial issues.....

2) Why?.....

71. How do you resolve them?.....

72. Which people get copies of the minutes and when are the copies distributed?.....

Copies:

Tick:



the governing body

parents

teachers

students

others (specify)

Time of distribution.....

N. B. Get copies of previous minutes/agenda.

73. How are proceedings of the minutes communicated to other participants of the school who do not get copies of the minutes?.....

**Remuneration and Reimbursement.**

74. Were members of the previous management committee paid?

1. yes

2. no

How much?.....

What for (e.g. travel allowances etc.)?.....

75. Is non-payment an issue for the current governing body? 1) yes 2) no

76. If yes, how are you dealing that?.....

77. Does this affect their duties at all? 1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

**Committees of the Governing Body.**

78. What other sub-committees existed with the ex-management committee?

99. What was the relationship between such committees and the management committee in terms of functions?.....

80. Presently which sub-committees do you have in the school, and what is the composition of each?

Sub-committees	Elected Members	Co-opted Members	Governing Body Members	Total
Sports				
Fund-raising				
Entertainment				
Other				

81. How were committee members selected?.....

82. What is the relationship between the committees and the governing body in terms of-

- a) Functions.....  
b) Decision-making.....

**Role of other Participants of the School.**

83. Besides the members of the governing body and sub-committees, how do you view the role of the rest of the participants of the school (what sort of contributions do they offer)?

Participants      Role

parents .....  
students .....  
teachers .....  
community .....

84. Do they understand the key issues?

1) yes 2) no 3) don't know

Explain.....

**NOW, QUESTIONS ABOUT FUNDING OF THE SCHOOL.**

**First, Payment of Fees.**

85. How much fees did students pay before the introduction of the SASA?.....

86. Who determined the amount?.....

What was the money used for?.....

*Comments: Probe for reason if students did not pay any fees.*

87. How much fees do students pay now, and what criterion is used to determine the amount?

Amount.....

Criterion.....

88. Do all parents pay equal amount of fees and why?

1) yes 2) no

Reason.....

89. Do you exempt parents unable to pay? 1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

90. How do you determine that a parent is incapable of paying?.....

Comments: Probe for reason if there is no exemption from payment of fees.

91. Do parents unable to pay do something in exchange? 1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

92. Are you and the members of the governing body as well as parents or students who are capable of paying happy about the exemption and why?

1) Happy 2) Unhappy

Principal  
Governing Body  
students/parents able to pay

Reason(s).....

**School Fund.**

93. Was there a school fund before the introduction of the SASA?

1) yes 2) no

94. What were the sources of the money, and what was it used for?

Sources.....

Uses.....

95. How were the funds kept?.....

96. What are the sources of the money for the current school fund?.....

97. How is the fund kept?.....

98. What is the fund used for?.....

99. Who directs the use of it?.....

**Annual Budgets.**

100. Did the school have annual budgets before the SASA was introduced?

1) yes 2) no

101. If not, how did you account for the money that was used?.....

102. If there was, who provided the guidelines for preparing them and who examined and approved of them?

Guidelines.....

Examination and Approval by.....

103. How are the current budgets drawn?.....

104. What do the budgets mainly consist of?.....

105. How is it examined and approved of?.....

106. What comments does the examiner of the budgets give and how do you react if the comments are unfavourable?

Comments.....

Reaction.....

**General Comments about the SASA.**

107. Has the SASA given you some kind of relief or made your work  
rather difficult?            1) relief            2) difficult

☐

Explain.....  
-----

108. In terms of national and provincial decisions about the governance of schools  
are you happy about the extent of your participation?    1)Yes    2)No

Explain.....

109. Would you say that the SASA extends the logic of participation to the fullest?

Explain.....  
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110. What are other schools' comments about the SASA?.....

.....  
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University of Cape Town

### INTERVIEW WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING BODY

**NB: At least one of each of the member categories (i.e. students, teachers, parents and co-opted members) will be interviewed.**

#### Some Questions about your election .

1. Were you a member of the previous management committee?

1) yes                      2) no

Tick



student  
teacher  
parent  
co-opted

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐

2. How were you elected or re-elected to be on the governing body?.....

3. What is your position on the governing body; are you a ..... member?

1) co-opted              OR              2) elected

☐

4. What is your occupation?.....

5. Does your job allow you to devote enough time to governing body responsibilities such as attending meetings?                      1) yes                      2) no

☐

6. If not, how do you cope with the responsibilities?.....

#### Few Questions about how the SASA was presented to you and your understanding of it.

7. As a member of the governing body, what do you know of the SASA and the Provincial Gazette Extraordinary (PGE) (also known as the Western Cape Provincial School Education Act, No. 12 of 1997)?

SASA.....

PGE.....

8. How did you get to know of them?.....

9. Do you have copies?                      1) yes                      2) no

☐

10. If not, why not?.....

11. If yes, how did you get them?.....

12. I found the SASA quite complicated; how about you, how were you able to comprehend it?.....

13. Have you and the other members of the governing body had any training?                      1. yes                      2. no

☐

*Comments: Probe for nature and duration of training.*

Nature.....

Duration.....

14. Has the training been sufficient, or do you need more?

1) sufficient                      2) more is needed

☐

Explain.....

**Membership, Office Bearers and Voting Rights of the Governing Body.**

15. There is parental majority on the governing body. Are you happy about this?                      1) yes                      2) no

Explain.....

16. (If not), which members of the governing body would you have preferred to be in the majority and why?

Members:                      1. teachers  
   2. non-educators of the school  
   3. students  
   4. other (specify)

Reason.....

17. Are you an office bearer?                      1) yes                      2) no

18. If yes, what position do you hold?.....

19. What problems do you encounter in discharging your duties, and how do you solve them?

Problem.....

Solution.....

20. (If respondent is co-opted) are you happy that co-opted members do not have voting rights on the governing body?

1) yes                      2) no

Explain.....

21. If not, how have you reacted to this, and what has been the result?

Reaction.....

Result.....

**SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNING BODY.**

**A. Admission of Students.**

22. Are you involved in the admission of students?

1) yes                      2) no

23. Is it appropriate to get involved in this?                      1) yes                      2) no

Explain.....

24. How do you select the students?

1) by test  
2) by interviews  
3) by application  
4) by application and test  
5) by application and interview  
6) first come, first served basis  
7) other

**B. Recommendation for the Appointment of Teachers**

25. Have you been or are you involved in the appointment of teachers?

1) yes                      2) no

Explain.....

26. Why did you choose the ones you did?.....

27. Have your involvement, as governing body members, in the appointment of teachers created any problems, and if so how were they resolved?

1) yes 2) no

☐

Solution.....

28. Do you think it is necessary or appropriate at all for the governing body to be involved in the appointment of teachers?

1) yes 2) no

☐

Explain.....

29. To what extent, and in what way, has the retrenchment of teachers affected your school, and what action have you taken?

Extent.....

Manner.....

Action taken.....

### **Ethos of the School and Enhancement of Quality of Education**

30. The matric results of the school are quite remarkable. What contributes to this? NB: Probe for response, using the table below.

#### **Management**

special promotion policy?

homework?

discipline (e.g. lateness)?

Yes No Explain

....

....

....

#### **Adequate Materials**

textbooks?

other (specify)

....

....

#### **Teachers**

quality?

....

#### **Devpt. Support**

parents & community;

other (specify)

....

....

....

### **Extra-mural Activities**

31. Do you have special extra-mural activities that contribute to the quality of education in the school and, for that matter, the good results?

1) yes

2) no

☐

32. What kind?

Tick

☒

sports  
clubs  
extra classes  
other (specify)

☐  
☐  
☐  
☐

Comments: Probe for types and reasons for types chosen.....

#### **Sports**

Types.....

Reason for choice.....

#### **Clubs**

Types.....

Reason for choice.....

#### **Extra classes**

Types.....

Reason for choice.....

#### **Others**

Specify.....

Reason for choice.....



**Constitution of the Governing Body.**

33. Do you have a copy of the constitution drawn by the governing body?

1) yes 2) no

34. If no, why not?.....

35. Were you involved in its drawing up? 1) yes 2) no

37. If no, why not?.....

38. If yes, explain how you went about it.....

39. Are you happy about the contents of the constitution?

1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

40. If not, how have you reacted to this and what has been the result?

Reaction.....

Result.....

**Remuneration and Reimbursement.**

41. Do you receive remuneration for being a governing body member?

1) yes 2) no

42. If yes, how much or in what form?.....

43. If not, would you like to have some remuneration?

1) yes 2) no

*Comments: Probe for the amount or the form in which the remuneration should take.....*

44. Why do you want to be remunerated?.....

45. But have you ever complained about the fact that you are not being remunerated? 1) yes 2) no

46. If no, why not?.....

47. If yes, what has been the result?.....

48. So in view of the fact that you are not being remunerated, how happy or desirous are you in discharging your duties?.....

**SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FUNDING OF THE SCHOOL.**

**1. Payment of fees.**

49. How much fees do students pay now, and what criterion is used to determine the amount?

Amount.....

Criterion.....

50. Do you agree with the amount charged? 1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

51. Did you play a part in determining the fee? 1) yes 2) no

If yes, explain how the fee was determined.....

If not, why did you not?.....

52. Why is it necessary or appropriate for the governing body to determine the fee charged?.....

53. Do all parents pay equal amount of fees.

1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

54. Do you exempt parents unable to pay? 1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

55. How do you determine that a parent is incapable of paying?.....

56. Are you and the other governing body members and parents/students  
(who are capable of paying) happy about the exemption?

1) Happy 2) Unhappy

Interviewee  
Governing Body  
Parents/students able to pay

Explain.....

57. How have you and/or those who are unhappy about the exemption  
reacted and what has been the result?

Reaction.....

Result.....

58. Do parents unable to pay do something in exchange?

1) yes 2) no

Explain.....

## 2. School Fund.

59. What are the sources of the money for the current school fund, what  
is the fund used for and who direct its usage?

Sources.....

Uses.....

Administered by.....

60. Is there a banking account for the fund? 1) yes 2) no

61. How was the account opened?.....

## Annual Budgets.

62. Are annual budgets prepared for the school? 1) yes 2) no

If no, why not?.....

63. If yes, how do you get them prepared?.....

64. What do the budgets mainly consist of?.....

65. Who examines and approves of them?.....

66. What comments does the examiner of the budgets give, and how do  
you explain if the comments are unfavourable?

Comments.....

Explanation.....

## Examination of Financial Records and Statements.

67. Who examines the school's financial records and statements?.....

68. What unfavourable comments does the examiner give, and how do  
you and other members of the governing body react to them?

Comments.....

Reaction.....

**General Comments about the SASA.**

69. What is your opinion of the SASA?.....

70. Would you say the SASA makes your work as a governing body member  
difficult or easy?                      1) difficult                      2) easy

Explain.....

71. Do you believe that in terms of national and provincial decisions about governance  
of schools the governing body enjoys full participation?

Explain.....

72. Would you say that the SASA extends the logic of participation to the fullest?

Explain.....

73. In the face of the SASA, how do you view community involvement,  
especially now that the school is in Mowbray?.....

.....

74. What are other schools' comments about the SASA?.....



University of Cape Town